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ABSTRACT
Cartel Mechanism Design:
Nonratifiable Conditions of Collusive Behavior. (December 2011)
Shao-Chieh Hsueh, B.S., National Taipei University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Guoqiang Tian
This dissertation is about an open question of cartel ratifiable conditions. My
research goal is to establish a mechanism which is able to detect and explain cartels’
activities.
My research question in the second chapter is whether or not an efficient cartel
mechanism is ratifiable in the first-price sealed-bid auction format with participa-
tion costs. R. McAfee and J. McMillan study the coordinated bidding strategies
in a strong cartel, which is incentive-compatible and efficient. This chapter inves-
tigates this efficient collusive mechanism with two important conditions (1) bidders
can update their information through a cartel’s prior auction and (2) they have to
pay participation costs to participate in seller’s auction. The concept of ratifiability,
introduced by P. Cramton and T. Palfrey, is applied to explore the first-price sealed-
bid auction with participation costs. I discovered that the efficient cartel mechanism,
such as pre-auction knockout, would be ratified when either of the two conditions ex-
ists. However, this mechanism is no longer ratifiable when both conditions exist. The
bidder with the highest value in the cartel would have incentive to betray, since doing
so sends a credible signal of high value. Hence, the other bidders will be discouraged
from participating in the seller’s auction and the highest-value bidder maximizes his
revenue.
In the third chapter, I studied the seller’s strategy when she faces a cartel in
an auction mechanism. An active seller’s optimal strategy is to raise the reserve
iv
price to a level that is higher than her own valuation. The collusive mechanism is
sustainable even though its revenue is extracted by the higher reserve price. If the
seller is authorized to change the auction mechanism, she can receive the expected
payoff, prevent the formation of a ring and keep the auction efficient. Further, I
presented two methods that could deter a cartel under specific conditions. One is the
residual claimants method as proposed by Y. Che and J. Kim and the other is to set
a positive participation cost as outlined in the first chapter. The residual claimants
method can inhibit a ring in many cases, but it may have some trouble in preventing
an efficient cartel mechanism when there is only one participant in the seller’s auction.
In the fourth chapter, I investigated how to achieve external efficiency in a re-
peated game. In particular, I looked into the allocation of the budgeted that allows
an authority, such as the government, to differentiate collusive behavior and to expose
agents to external threats. A threshold level of the budget payment is found in an
incentive compatible collusive mechanism for which the government can prevent an
agent from participating. In a two-stage model, I showed that if the government can
boost exemption or have more budget to subsidize agents, it is less likely that a ring
will be formed.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
An efficient cartel mechanism is not freely implemented. Osborne [20] claims
that a cartel faces one external and four internal problems. A cartel has to anticipate
and prevent outside production in order to avoid external threat. The four internal
problems are designing the rule, dividing the profit, detecting, and deterring cheating.
When an illegal cartel is formed, it eliminates competition in the marketplace, makes
its own secret decision to boost price and then takes steps to stick to high prices.
It is against social welfare. In reality, it is hard to detect collusive behavior. When
a cartel is formed, it usually comes with huge amount of financial benefit. And the
cartel could earn excess profit from consumers’ surplus. This is an unfair and illegit-
imate phenomena. In this dissertation, I investigate the ratifiable and nonratifiable
conditions of a cartel mechanism with auction format.
An auction is an effective way to extract private information by increasing the
competition of potential buyers and thus can increase allocation efficiency from the
perspectives of both sellers and the social optimum when we do not have complete
information about bidders’ types. The private information also makes it more difficult
for the bidders to profitably collude and share the generated collusive surplus, which
may destabilize the collusive ring.
This dissertation is mainly based on McAfee and McMillan [17] paper. They
establish an efficient cartel mechanism, which is ratifiable in the first-price sealed-bid
auction format. The model consists of one seller and n bidders. The seller’s behavior
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Economic Theory.
2is passive. She sets a reserve price to the object she wants to sell, and then she holds
a legit auction to sell the object. She does not know whether she faces a cartel or
not. There are two strong assumptions in this mechanism. One is that all bidders
are in the cartel at the beginning. The other is that members in the cartel can make
transfer payment. This transfer payment can make everyone in the cartel better off
compared to the case if they are not in the cartel. Why is this true? The cartel
would hold a prior auction before the seller’s legit auction. All bidders submit a bid
to the cartel. The cartel would choose the bidder with the highest bid to participate
in the legit auction. Since all bidders are in the cartel at first but there is only one
bidder in the legit auction, he can submit the lowest bid which is equal to the seller’s
reserve price, and win the auction for sure. The transfer payment is the difference
between the winning bid in the prior auction and seller’s reserve price. This transfer
payment is distributed equally to all members in the cartel. In first-price auction,
when the cartel does not exist, the winner is the bidder who places the highest bid
in the auction, and he pays what he bids in the auction, and others get nothing. In
efficient cartel mechanism, the winner also pays what he bids in the prior auction
and gets the object. But he can earn extra profit, which is the transfer payment. All
other losers in the cartel can also earn this extra profit. Everyone in the cartel is
better than the noncollusive case, so nobody has incentive to betray the cartel. Thus,
the cartel is ratifiable.
An auction with participation costs is a mechanism in which buyers must incur
some costs, like entry fees, in order to participate in the auction. After the costs
are incurred, a bidder can submit a bid. Sometimes pre-bid costs are also required
to involve in auctions. If a bidder’s expected profit from an auction is less than the
participation costs, he will not attend the auction. Even if the bidder’s valuation
is greater than the participation costs, he may not have the same bidding strategy
3as that of without participation costs. Thus, I should consider the efficient cartel
mechanism with participation costs as a more realistic model.
In Tan and Yilankaya [24] paper, they study McAfee and McMillan’s model with
participation costs, and they show that the cartel mechanism cannot be ratifiable in
the second-price sealed-bid auction format. My question is whether the strong cartel
mechanism is ratifiable in the first-price sealed-bid auction format with participation
costs. Chapter II indicates the conditions that the cartel cannot be ratifiable. The
cartel mechanism designed in McAfee and McMillan [17] is self-enforcement. When
all members are better than the noncollusive case, no one has incentive to veto for
the cartel. Even if the winner in the prior auction betrays the cartel, others who
could bid in the auction for free, already know the winner’s value. They can bid as
much as possible to make the betrayer earn less profit than he stays in the cartel.
So, the winner in the prior auction would not have incentives to betray the cartel.
When participation costs exist, bidders cannot bid in the legit auction for free. After
the prior auction, members in the cartel know who has the highest value in cartel’s
auction. If the winner vetoes for the cartel, others know that they will lose for sure if
they participate in the legit auction. Due to the participation costs, they would not
participate in the legit auction; otherwise, they have to pay the nonrefundable costs,
which end up with negative profits. After the prior auction, if the winner chooses to
betray the cartel, he would also be the only bidder in the legit auction. He can bid
the lowest value and win for sure. With the above facts, the winner in the cartel has
incentive to betray the cartel, hence the cartel is not ratifiable in the economy.
There is a group of papers investigating how to minimize the loss resulted from
the cartel. In Laffont and Martimort [14, 15] papers, they find that the principal
can achieve the optimal outcome at no cost when the agents are uncorrelated. When
agents’ values are correlated, a large cost is incurred to the principal in order to pre-
4vent collusive behavior. Che and Kim [3] design a new mechanism which provides the
same expected revenue to the principal as that in noncollusive case of both uncorre-
lated and correlated types. Bidders in this mechanism become residual claimants of
the entire surplus.
In Chapter III, I consider all possible values of buyers’ that the seller may face,
and try to analyze how the seller maximizes her expected revenue and minimizes
the cartel’s revenue when the efficient cartel mechanism exists. Given imperfect
information between the seller and buyers, the seller’s problem is to design an auction
that provides her with the highest expected profit at Nash equilibrium. I investigate
the question: what is the seller’s optimal strategy to maximize her revenue when she
is allowed to detect collusive behavior. My conclusion is that the seller’s best strategy
is to raise the reserve price to a higher level than her own value of the object. When
she raise the reserve price, the object may not be sold even if a bidder’s value is higher
than her value. Another result in this chapter is that when bidders can update their
information through their participating decisions, the cartel mechanism is sustainable
regardless of the seller’s type.
Additionally, I consider the case when the seller is authorized to change the
mechanism (for example, the payment mechanism), and find that if the seller can-
not influence nonparticipating bidders, she cannot prevent the cartel, even with the
residual claimants method in Che and Kim [3]. I suggest that the seller can set
up a positive participation cost for the bidders in the seller’s auction to forbid the
formation of a cartel as my result in Chapter II.
Although a cartel is prohibited by law in many countries, it is difficult to detect
collusive behavior in the real world. If the government could not detect collusive
behavior, is there any method that can help the government differentiate collusive
behavior? As mentioned in Osborne [20] and McAfee and McMillan [17], if the effects
5of the obstacles that the cartel has to overcome can be enhanced by the government,
it is easier for the government to prevent the formation of a ring.
Chapter IV investigates: (1) the difference in the behavior of heterogeneous
firms in different economic states, (2) how the government chooses to give them a
premium or punishment, in reputation or in finance, in order to increase consumers’
welfare and induce the government to differentiate collusive mechanism. I specify
the government’s role in the efficient cartel mechanism, and explore the allocation of
government’s budget that entitles to regulate collusive behavior in a repeated game.
The result is that allocating the budget among firms equally may lead to a collapse
of collusive mechanism in some cases. In others, however, symmetric allocation may
induce the agents to form a ring.
I also have a concern on whether the government should choose exemption or
subsidy to destabilize the collusive behavior. The difference between exemption and
subsidy is that exemption is usually restrained by law and it is costly to change,
while subsidy is more applicable in reality. My conclusion is that if the exemption (it
could be a premium or punishment) is large enough, members in a cartel may have
incentives to veto, and outsiders may not participate in the collusive mechanism.
On the other hand, an individual firm that receives subsidy from the government,
is likely to earn more profit and thus not has incentives to participate in a collusive
mechanism.
6CHAPTER II
NONRATIFIABILITY OF THE CARTEL MECHANISM IN FIRST-PRICE
SEALED-BID AUCTION WITH PARTICIPATION COSTS
2.1. Introduction
Asymmetric information between bidders makes them difficult to profitably col-
lude and share the generated collusive surplus, which may destabilize a collusive ring.
As pointed out by Cooper [4], vindictive strategies are used to enforce collusion.
When a member betrays the ring, it would increase the seller’s revenue as revengeful
competition leading to crazy prices.
Under different assumptions, the requirements of a successful collusive mecha-
nism are different. Roberts [23] shows if firms are similar, the cooperative organiza-
tion cannot be achieved without side payments. If side payments are allowed, it is a
dominant strategy for every member to join the cartel. The expected revenue of the
mechanism is equal to the revenue in second-price auction. Graham and Marshall
[8] analyze collusion in second-price sealed-bid and English auction with independent
private values. In second-price auction with reserve price, they show that a knockout
pre-auction mechanism organized by an outsider is efficient and sustainable. The
knockout mechanism is also ex ante budget balanced among bidders. Mailath and
Zemsky [16] consider second-price auction with reserve price and heterogeneous bid-
ders. They discover that for any subset of bidders, there is an incentive compatible
and individually rational collusive mechanism, which is ex post budget balanced and
efficient. Cramton and Palfrey [5] find that, when private information exists, a cartel
agreement is possible in the economy. Given incentives and participation constraints,
they characterize a branch of applicable contracts. If a cartel is sustainable without
7unanimous members’ agreements, the incentive problem can be avoided in a large
cartel. When uncertainty exists, regardless of the ratification rule, a perfect collusion
is possible in a large cartel.
As the synthesis of standard mechanism design literatures, McAfee and McMillan
[17] explore the bidding strategies in first-price sealed-bid auction under two cases:
weak cartel, in which bidders cannot make transfer payments, and strong cartel, in
which the members can exclude new entrants and make transfer payments among
themselves. In weak cartel, bidders can place identical bid in seller’s legit auction to
achieve the optimal outcome without colluding. When side-payments are prohibited,
incentive compatibility condition requires that the object should be allocated with
equal probability to anyone whose value is greater than the seller’s price. Bidders
treat the seller as their randomizing device by placing equal bids. In strong cartel,
the optimal cartel mechanism can reach the efficiency by implementing a prior auction
before the seller’s legit auction. The cartel would choose the bidder with the highest
value to participate in the seller’s auction. Since all bidders are in the cartel at
first but there is only one bidder in the seller’s auction, he can submit the lowest
bid which is equal to the seller’s reserve price, and win the auction for sure. The
transfer payment is the difference between the winning bid in the prior auction and
seller’s reserve price. This transfer payment is distributed equally to all members
in the cartel. With this extra payment, everyone in the cartel is better than the
noncollusive case, so nobody has incentive to betray the cartel.
The strong cartel is incentive-compatible and efficient. However, this mechanism
ignores two important conditions in reality. One is that bidders can update their infor-
mation (as called the information leakage problem) from their participation decisions
in the prior auction. Cramton and Palfrey [6] show that the information leakage
problem from bidders’ participation decisions in the prior auction would disintegrate
8the optimal cartel mechanism. Bidders can observe a bidder’s type from his choice
of whether vetoing the collusive mechanism, which in turn may affect the seller’s
revenue. In order to specify this problem, they set up a two-stage game: all players
simultaneously vote for or against the collusive mechanism. This vote is held at the
interim stage. If the collusive mechanism is unanimously accepted, it is implemented;
otherwise they participate in seller’s auction with updated information.
The other one is that bidders may incur some costs, like entry fees, when they
participate in an auction. After the costs are incurred, a bidder can submit a bid.
Sometimes pre-bid costs are also required to involve in auctions. Mills [18] points
out that the bidding costs in a government procurement auction often runs into
millions of dollars. If a bidder’s expected profit from an auction is less than the
participation costs, he will not attend the auction. Even if the bidder’s valuation
is greater than the participation costs, he may not have the same bidding strategy
as that of without participation costs. Thus, I should consider the efficient cartel
mechanism with participation costs as a more realistic model.
Tan and Yilankaya [24] apply Cramton and Palfrey’s [6] concept to show that
the efficient collusive mechanism with independent private values is not ratifiable in
second-price auction with positive participation costs. I investigate the efficient col-
lusive mechanism in first-price sealed-bid auction with information leakage problem
and positive participation costs because McAfee and McMillan examine the strong
cartel primarily at sealed-bid first-price auctions. By constructing a veto set that if
a bidder’s value belongs in this set, he will choose to betray the cartel, and following
the optimal inverse bidding function that is found in Cao and Tian [2] paper, I extend
the strong cartel under the conditions if either the participation costs or information
leakage problem does not exist. However, I get a negative result when both condi-
tions exist. By vetoing the mechanism, a bidder sends a credible signal that he has
9relatively high value, which discourages the other bidders from joining a ring when
there are positive participation costs. Thus, there may be a discontinuity between no
participation costs and positive participation costs when information leakage problem
exists.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Chapter 2.2 describes the
model and investigate the nonratifiable condition of the efficient cartel mechanism.
Chapter 2.3 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix A.
2.2. Model
There are one seller and n (n ≥ 2) bidders in the economy. Bidder i’s value
is vi ∈ V , i = (1, ..., n), which represents i’s willingness to pay for an object in an
auction, and v = (v1, ..., vn) is the vector of n bidders’ profile. vi is private information
which is a random draw from a population with a cumulative distribution function
F (·) and density function f(·) supported on [0, 1]. The seller values her object at
r ∈ [0, 1]. She is assumed to be passive in this model, i.e., she does not know whether
she faces a cartel. She announces a reserve price and sells an indivisible object to the
bidder at the highest bid in a first-price sealed-bid auction. I denote participation
costs, c ∈ (0, 1), for which bidders must pay before they bid. Bidders do not know
others’ participation decisions when they make theirs. Only the winner in seller’s
auction has to pay the reserve price and all participants in seller’s auction have to
pay the participation costs.
2.2.1. Non-Collusive Auction
In order to simplify the calculation and notation, I assume that the reserve price
r equals to 0. Suppose that Y1 is the maximum value of other n− 1 bidders’ values,
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and denote F (Y1)
n−1 = G(Y1). The expected payment γ(vi) in first-price sealed-bid
auction can be written as
γ(vi) = v
∗G(v∗) +
∫ vi
v∗
ydG(y),
where v∗ is the cutoff point, which is determined by c = v∗F (v∗)n−1, v∗ > c. If vi < v∗,
the bidder i does not participate in the auction. I can write bidder i’s expected utility
when vi ≥ v∗ as follows:
pisi (vi) = G(vi)vi − γ(vi).
Thus, after integration by parts, the noncollusive profit pisi (vi) for bidder i is as follows:
pisi (vi) =
 0 vi < v
∗∫ vi
v∗ G(y)dy vi ≥ v∗.
2.2.2. Efficient Cartel Mechanism
An efficient cartel designs an incentive-compatible mechanism in order to max-
imize the ex ante sum of bidders’ expected profits with transfer payment, i.e., this
cartel is self-enforcement. Bidder i’s payoff function is pimi (vi), by reporting his value
to the cartel mechanism before seller’s auction and pimi (0) is the transfer payment
received by each cartel member.
The efficient cartel mechanism works as follows. While the bidders reporting their
values to the cartel mechanism, the ith bidder is awarded the good with probability
pi(wi, w−i), where wi is the value reported from bidder i and w−i is the vector of other
bidders’. Then, bidder i’s expected profit pimi (wi, vi), if he has value vi and reports
wi, is
pimi (wi, vi) = E−i[vipi(wi, w−i)− Zi(wi, w−i)− c],
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where E−i is the expectation over w−i, and Zi(·) is the total transfer payment in the
cartel. After dropping the bidder indices to simplify the notation, pim(w, v) becomes:
pim(w, v) = [v − Z(w)− c]F (w)n−1
+ [1− F (w)n−1]
∫ 1
w
[
Z(u)
n− 1]
(n− 1)F (u)n−2f(u)
1− F (w)n−1 du
= [v − Z(w)− c]F (w)n−1
+
∫ 1
w
[Z(u)]F (u)n−2f(u)du.
∂pim(w,v)
∂v
= F (w)n−1. Thus, we can write
pim(v) =
 pi
m(0) if v < c.
pim(0) +
∫ v
c
G(u)du if v ≥ c,
(1)
where pim(0) is the transfer payment received by each cartel member. The cartel’s
total revenue is the expected difference between the winner’s value and the partici-
pation costs. The density function of the winner’s value is nF (v)n−1f(v). The total
revenue for the cartel, pic(v), is:
pic(v) =
1
n
∫ 1
c
(v − c)nF (v)n−1f(v)dv
=
∫ 1
0
pim(v)f(v)dv
= pim(0) +
∫ 1
c
∫ v
c
F (u)n−1duf(v)dv
= pim(0) +
∫ 1
c
[1− F (v)]F (v)n−1dv.
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Thus, the transfer payment pim(0) is
pim(0) =
1
n
∫ 1
c
(v − c)nF (v)n−1f(v)dv
−
∫ 1
c
[1− F (v)]F (v)n−1dv
=
∫ 1
c
[y − 1− F (y)
f(y)
− c]G(y)dF (y).
Since v∗ ≥ c, and pim(0) ≥ 0, we obtain
pim(v) ≥ pis(v).
This means that the efficient cartel mechanism satisfies bidders’ individual rational
condition. Bidders in the cartel earn more profit, whether they win the object or not.
2.2.3. Nonratifying Condition of the Cartel Mechanism
In this part, I investigate the efficient cartel mechanism when c ≥ 0, and bidders
can update their beliefs through the cartel’s prior auction.
First, I explore a knockout cartel mechanism with c > 0. The cartel mechanism
is as follows. The cartel holds a prior auction before the seller’s auction. After bidders
report their bids to the cartel, the cartel chooses the bidder with the highest bid to
represent the cartel in the seller’s auction. Specifically, the timing of possible cartel
formation between date 0 and date 1 works as follows:
• At date 0, a cartel’s mechanism exists and all bidders are in the cartel.
• At date 1
4
, nature draws a private valuation for each bidder.
• At date 2
4
, each bidder reports his bid in cartel’s prior auction.
• At date 3
4
, bidders update their beliefs through the cartel’s auction and vote for
or against the collusive mechanism.
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• At date 1, if all bidders accepted the collusive mechanism at date 3
4
, the winner
in the prior auction represents the cartel to bid in the seller’s auction, and he
will compensate the losers with transfer payment. If at least one bidder rejects
the collusive mechanism, no collusion occurs. Bidders bid in the seller’s auction
at date 1 noncooperatively.
Definition 1 The information leakage problem is that all bidders can update their
information through the cartel’s prior auction before they participate in the seller’s
auction.
I assume that when a bidder is indifferent between staying in and vetoing for the
cartel, he would choose to stay in the cartel. In order to show that bidders may have
incentive to jump out the cartel, I define a veto set A. If the vetoer’s value is in this
set, he will veto for the cartel, that is, vetoing for the cartel brings higher profit to
the vetoer than in collusive case. pivi (vi) denotes the vetoer’s payoff.
Definition 2 A ⊆ [0, 1] is said to be a credible veto set if the individual rational (IR)
condition, pimi (vi) > pi
v
i (vi), is not satisfied, i.e.,
(1) A 6= ∅,
(2) pivi (vi) > pi
m
i (vi)⇒ vi ∈ A,
(3) pivi (vi) < pi
m
i (vi)⇒ vi /∈ A.
Definition 3 The cartel is “nonratifiable” if other bidders will update their beliefs
about the vetoer i’s value, and identify that the vetoer’s value belongs to the credible
veto set A after bidder i chooses to jump out of the cartel.
Definition 4 The cartel mechanism is ratifiable, if for each bidder i either
(1) there is no credible veto set for i, or
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(2) there is a credible veto set A and a corresponding equilibrium bid b∗ such that
pimi (vi) = pi
v
i (vi) for all vi ∈ A.
Suppose when one of the bidders vetoes the cartel, others believe that his value
is in [vN , 1], so A = [vN , 1] is a credible veto set for any bidder i. I will present that,
there is an asymmetric equilibrium of the auction with these updated beliefs, such
that the vetoer’s payoff in this equilibrium is larger than his payoff in the cartel if his
value is larger than vN .
Consider the first-price auction where the bidders in the cartel with values are
distributed on [0, 1], and the vetoer’s value is distributed on [vN , 1]. The asymmetric
equilibrium I consider in this auction, denoted by b∗, is given as follows. For the
vetoer,
b∗i (vi) = λ(vi) ∀vi ∈ [vN , 1],
where λ(vi) is a contingent bidding function when bidder i participates in the auction.
For bidders in the cartel,
b∗j(vj) =
 N0 vj ≤ vYλ(vj) vj > vY ∀j 6= i.
N0 indicates that the bidder does not participate in seller’s auction. In this equilib-
rium, all bidders staying in the cartel use the same cutoff point vY , which is deter-
mined by the indifferent participation condition. Following Cao and Tian [2] paper,
I assume that bidding function is monotonic increasing. Thus the optimal inverse
bidding functions are uniquely determined by
vi(b) = b+
F (vj(b))
(n− 1)f(vj(b))v′j(b)
, (2)
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and
vj(b) = b+
F (vj(b))[F (vi(b))− F (vN)]
(n− 2)f(vj(b))v′j(b)[F (vi(b))− F (vN)] + F (vj(b))f(vi(b))v′i(b)
, (3)
with boundary conditions vi(b) = vN , vj(b) = b,
1 and vi(b) = vj(b) = 1. b and b
are the lower and upper bounds that bidders would bid. From the optimal inverse
bidding function, we have to find the relationship between the bidders’ bids and their
values.
From vi(b), I have
v
′
j(b) =
F (vj(b))
(vi(b)− b)(n− 1)f(vj(b)) .
Substitute in vj(b).
vj(b) = b+
F (vj(b))[F (vi(b))− F (vN)]
(n− 2)f(vj(b))v′j(b)[F (vi(b))− F (vN)] + F (vj(b))f(vi(b))v′i(b)
= b+
F (vi(b))− F (vN)
(n−2
n−1)(
F (vi(b))−F (vN )
vi(b)−b ) + f(vi(b))v
′
i(b)
. (4)
Because the inverse bidding function is monotonic increasing according to b, the
relationship is uniquely determined. Define Q(vi(b)) ≡ vj(vi), where Q(vi(b)) is the
1From Cao and Tian [2], b = max argmaxb F (b)
n−1(vN − b).
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relationship between vj and vi when b = bj = bi.
k(vi) = p(bi > bj|vi > vN)
= p(vj < Q(vi)|vi > vN)
=
P (vj < Q(vi), vi > vN)
P (vi > vN)
=
∫ 1
vN
f(vi)
∫ Q(vi)
0
f(vj)dvjdvi
1− F (vN)
=
[1− F (vN)]F (Q(vi))
1− F (vN)
= F (Q(vi)).
Let H(vi) = k(vi)
n−1 be the probability that all other bidders’ bids are less
than vetoer i’s. For any given bidder in the cartel, the maximum of others’ bids is
distributed according to Hˆ(y) ≡ k(y)F (y)n−2. Let v˜Y be the solution to
[v˜Y − b∗j(v˜Y )]Hˆ(v˜Y ) = c.
The payoff of a v˜Y type bidder is equal to his participation costs, whenever v˜Y ≤ 1.
I have vY = min{1, v˜Y } and vN < vY ≤ 1 because
[vN − b∗j(vN)]Hˆ(vN) = 0.
Notice that vY is the cutoff point where bidders are indifferent between staying in
and vetoing for the cartel. An increase in vN leads to a higher vY . Thus we have that
vY is a strictly increasing function of vN until it reaches 1 for some value of vN and
stays there for higher value of vN . The payoff of vetoer i is
pivi (vi) = max{[vi − λ(vi)]H(vi)− c, 0}.
Comparing this payoff with pimi (vi) from the cartel leads to the following lemma. All
17
proofs are in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 There exists a vN ∈ (c, 1) such that pivi (vi) ≥ pimi (vi) if and only if vi ≥ vN .
Lemma 1 shows that once bidder i chooses to veto for the cartel (and the equilibrium
b∗i is played) and others believe that his value exceeds vN , i would benefit from vetoing
if and only if his value exceeds vN . Thus, A = [vN , 1] is a credible veto set for player
i. Furthermore, there is no credible veto set for which all bidders in this set are
indifferent between vetoing and ratifying, which means that
pivi (vi) = pi
m
i (vi) (5)
does not hold. This is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 There is no credible veto set A (for any i) and corresponding equilibrium
b∗i in the post-veto auction such that pi
v
i (vi) = pi
m
i (vi) ∀vi ∈ A.
Proposition 1 follows from Definition 4 and Lemma 1 and 2.
Proposition 1 In first-price sealed-bid auction, when c is positive, and the informa-
tion leakage problem exists, the cartel mechanism is not ratifiable.
Having updated their beliefs that the vetoer’s value belongs to A, other bid-
ders do not participate in seller’s auction since they have to pay the non-refundable
participation costs and earn a negative profit. The cartel mechanism is not ratifiable.
Then I turn to the case when c = 0, and bidders can update their beliefs from
cartel’s auction. With their information through the cartel’s auction, if there is any
bidder vetoing for the cartel after the cartel’s auction, other bidders can enter the
seller’s auction for free and bid as much as possible to make the vetoer earn less or
equal profit than his cartel revenue. The game becomes an auction without collusion.
pimi (vi) ≥ pivi (vi) = pisi (vi). This means that there is a discontinuity at c = 0.
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Proposition 2 The efficient cartel mechanism is sustainable without participation
costs, even if the information leakage problem exists. Thus, there is a discontinuity
at c = 0.
I discover that the efficient cartel mechanism cannot be ratifiable when both
information leakage problem and positive participation costs exist. When participa-
tion costs exist without information leakage problem, the efficient cartel mechanism
is ratifiable. This efficient cartel mechanism is designed to maximize bidders’ ex ante
expected profit. Without information leakage problem, bidders cannot update their
beliefs through cartel’s auction, so nobody has incentive to jump out of the cartel.
On the other hand, when information leakage problem exists without participation
costs, this cartel mechanism is still ratifiable. Because bidders can submit a bid in
the seller’s auction for free, the vetoer cannot earn extra profit from betraying the
cartel. Thus, I extend the efficient cartel mechanism in two cases: either the partici-
pation cost or the information leakage problem exists, the efficient cartel mechanism
is ratifiable. However, when both exist at the same time, under the conditions in
Lemma 1, the efficient cartel is not ratifiable.
2.2.4. Different Participation Costs
In this part, I consider the case when bidders have different participation costs.
Assume that a monotonic equilibrium (v∗i , v
∗
j ) exists, i.e., v
∗
j < v
∗
i and cj < ci, when
the distribution function is concave. Another assumption is that vi ≥ v∗i > v∗j = vj
(we only consider the case that bidders with higher values would have higher costs).
If the higher-values bidders have lower participation costs, the result is obviously the
same as in Chapter 2.2.3. When information leakage problem exists, the bidder with
the highest value would veto for the cartel. Note that the participation costs now
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become private information in this economic environment.
In cartel’s auction, bidders would submit their bids to the cartel when their
values are higher than the sum of seller’s reserve price and their own participation
costs. If bidders have to report the level at their values minus the participation costs,
the type i bidders would use a higher cutoff point and submit a equilibrium bid b∗ to
convince the others that their values belong to a credible veto set A. thus, everyone
in the cartel would believe that type i bidders’ net values are larger than that of type
j’s, and the type i bidders have incentive to betray the cartel. If the losers (type
j bidders) in cartel’s auction participate in seller’s auction, they will lose for sure.
They do not want to pay the non-refundable participation costs. The bidder with the
largest net value would have incentive to betray the cartel to maximize his revenue
if his value is in A. This result is only held when F (·) is concave. Otherwise, the
monotonic cutoff vector may not be the only one equilibrium. Accordingly, bidders
with higher net values may not have a credible veto set to convince other bidders in
the cartel. Thus, the cartel is ratifiable in this case.
2.3. Conclusion
As McAfee and McMillan [17] point out, a cartel agreement is worthless without
some way to enforce it. Since contracts to fix prices usually cannot be written, any
collusive agreement must be designed to be self enforcing. If individual rational con-
dition and incentive compatible constraint could not be supported, the efficient col-
luding mechanism is not freely implemented. When bidders’ actions are strategically
interactive and their outcome is affected by bidders’ beliefs about others’ values, the
standard mechanism design approach may suffer from information leakage problem.
This observation is important when bidders are making interim decisions whether to
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participate in the collusive mechanism.
When collusion forms, it usually brings some losses to the economy, like reducing
market competition or compressing consumers’ welfare. In order to reduce the pos-
sibility of collusion, I want to investigate members’ behavior in a cartel mechanism.
This may provide important suggestions for the government to differentiate cartel or
to prevent the formation of a cartel. In this chapter, the efficient cartel mechanism is
no longer sustainable in the presence of positive participation costs and information
leakage problem. The bidder with the highest value would choose to veto for the
collusive mechanism. This behavior could maximize his benefit and leave all others
with zero profit.
In the next chapter, I would like to check seller’s behavior if she is not passive,
and the third-party authority’s strategies that can destabilize the cartel in Chapter
IV.
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CHAPTER III
EFFICIENT SELLING MECHANISM WITH BUYERS’ CARTEL AND ACTIVE
SELLER
3.1. Introduction
Asymmetric information usually results in collusive behavior among bidders. In
reality, the collusive behavior is often found in an industry with heterogeneous firms
and private information. In order to reduce the possible inefficiency caused by col-
lusion, an auction mechanism is usually used to enhance efficiency. Myerson [19]
considers seller’s optimal auction design problem in which she has an indivisible ob-
ject to sell to one of several buyers. Given there is imperfect information between the
seller and buyers, the seller’s problem is to design an auction that provides her with
the highest expected profit at Nash equilibrium. Thus, the seller must consider all
possible value of buyers and try to choose an auction mechanism that maximizes her
expected revenue.
Is this optimal auction mechanism able to prevent collusive behavior? The answer
is that it depends. The well-known advantage of auction will diminish when bidders
have ample incentives to collude. However, it is difficult for bidders to profitably
collude and share the generated collusive surplus because of private information.
As the synthesis of standard mechanism design literatures, McAfee and McMillan
[17] point out that the efficient collusive mechanism cannot be implemented with no
cost. They explore the bidding strategies in first-price sealed-bid auction and show
that when members can exclude new entrants and make transfer payments among
themselves, the optimal cartel mechanism can reach the efficiency by implementing a
prior auction. Cramton and Palfrey [6] find that the information leakage problem from
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bidders’ participation decisions in the prior auction would disintegrate the optimal
cartel mechanism. Bidders can observe a bidder’s type from his choice of whether
vetoing the collusive mechanism, which in turn may affect the seller’s revenue. In
order to specify this problem, they set up a two-stage game: all players simultaneously
vote for or against the collusive mechanism. This vote is held at the interim stage. If
the collusive mechanism is unanimously accepted, it is implemented; otherwise they
participate in seller’s auction with updated information.
There is a group of papers investigating how to minimize the loss resulted from
the cartel. Laffont and Martimort [14, 15] find that if the agents are uncorrelated,
the optimal outcome can be achieved at no cost for the principal. When agents
are correlated, in order to prevent collusion, the principal has to pay a large cost.
Che and Kim [3] construct a new mechanism that provides the principal with the
same expected revenue as that in noncollusive case with risk neutral agents for both
uncorrelated and correlated types. This mechanism forces the bidders in a collusion
to be a residual claimant of the entire surplus.
In an efficient selling mechanism, the seller’s behavior is usually assumed to be
passive.1 She announces a reserve price and sells an indivisible object to the bidder
with the highest bid in an auction, and she does not know if she faces a cartel.
Instead, I assume that the seller is active in this chapter. That is, the seller is
allowed to detect collusive behavior. I establish a general auction mechanism without
a particular auction format, and explore the seller’s optimal strategy. The result
is that the seller’s best strategy is to raise the reserve price to a higher level than
her own value of the object. This method may not satisfy the efficient condition,
because the object may not be sold even if a bidder’s value is higher than the seller’s
1For example, the mechanism in McAfee and McMillan [17], and Tan and Yi-
lankaya [24].
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value. Moreover, when information leakage problem exists, the cartel mechanism is
sustainable regardless of the seller’s type.
Additionally, I consider the possibility when the seller is authorized to change the
mechanism (for example, the payment mechanism). The residual claimants method
(Che and Kim [3]) guarantees the seller to receive her expected payoff by raising
reserve price and the object sold to the bidder with the highest value. In our model,
this method may not be able to prevent bidders from joining a cartel. When the
efficient cartel exists, there is only one bidder representing the cartel to bid in the
seller’s auction. If the seller cannot influence nonparticipating bidders, she cannot
prevent the cartel. I suggest another method to forbid the formation of a cartel.
That is, the seller can set up a positive participation cost for the bidders in the
seller’s auction. In Hsueh and Tian [12], I show that when both information leakage
problem and participation costs exist, the cartel mechanism cannot be sustained. The
bidder with the highest value would have incentive to jump out of the cartel, which
promises him a higher profit.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Chapter 3.2 describes the
model. In Chapter 3.3, I demonstrate the bidders’ and the seller’s optimal strategies.
Chapter 3.4 investigates the case when the seller is allowed to change the original
auction mechanism. Chapter 3.5 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix B.
3.2. Model
There are one seller and n (n ≥ 2) bidders in the economy. Bidder i’s value for
the object is vi ∈ V , and v = (v1, ..., vn) represents the vector of n bidders’ value.
vi is private information which is a random draw from a population with cumulative
distribution function F (·) and density function f(·) supported on [0, 1]. vh is the
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highest value among bidders. The seller values her single indivisible object at v0 and
sets a reserve price r ≥ v0. I assume that the seller has no private information about
the object, so v0 is known to all bidders. The seller cannot force every bidder to join
her auction. Bidders would participate in seller’s auction if their values are higher
than r, and they do not know others’ participation decisions when they make theirs.
3.2.1. Direct Revelation Mechanism
I apply the concept “revelation principle”, which shows that the outcomes gen-
erated from any equilibrium of any mechanism can be sustained by a truthful equilib-
rium of some direct mechanism. There is no loss of generality in restricting attention
to direct mechanism. The direct revelation mechanism is that, bidders would simul-
taneously report their values to the seller, and the seller decides who is the winner
and how much the winner should pay. The auction is efficient when the object is
allocated to the bidder with the highest value.
This mechanism can be summarized in a pair of outcome functions (h, x) such
that, hi(v) is the probability that bidder i wins the auction and xi(v) is bidder i’s
expected payment, then bidder i’s expected utility function is2
Ui(vi, v−i) = E−i[vihi(vi, v−i)− xi(vi, v−i)]. (6)
E−i is the expectation over v−i, and v−i is the vector of other bidders’ values. The
seller’s expected utility function is3
U0 = E{v0[1−
∑
i∈n
hi(v)] +
∑
i∈n
xi(v)}. (7)
2I prove this utility function is equivalent to the utility function in first-price and
second-price sealed-bid auction. The proof is in Appendix B.
3This utility function is based on Myerson [19].
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The direct revelation mechanism has to satisfy three following conditions.
The first condition is that the probability must satisfy:
∑
i∈n
hi(v) ≤ 1 and hi(v) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ n, ∀v ∈ V. (8)
The second condition is to guarantee that bidders will have incentive to partici-
pate seller’s auction. The individual rational (IR) condition is:
Ui(vi, v−i) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ n. (9)
Because bidders may have incentives misreporting their valuation, the third con-
dition is to elicit the true values from bidders. The following incentive compatible
(IC) constraint should be satisfied:
Ui(vi, v−i) ≥ Ui(zi, v−i) ∀i ∈ n, (10)
where zi is the value bidder i reports to the seller.
An auction mechanism (h, x) is feasible if (8), (9), and (10) are all satisfied. This
means that the seller could allocate the object according to h and get a payment
according to x with all bidders honestly reporting their value.
LetM denote the set of feasible mechanisms. For expressional simplicity, I define
Mi(hi, vi) ≡ E−ihi(vi, v−i). (11)
3.2.2. Collusive Auction
In this part, I first describe a pre-auction knockout cartel mechanism. Then, I
specify the seller’s behavior.
The seller may face a knockout cartel which runs as follows. The cartel holds a
prior auction before the seller’s auction. After the bidders report their bids to the
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cartel, the cartel chooses the bidder with the highest bid to represent the cartel to
bid in the seller’s auction. Specifically, considering possible cartel formation between
date 0 and date 1, the timing is as follows:
• At date 0, a cartel’s mechanism exists and all bidders are in the cartel.
• At date 1
4
, nature draws a private valuation for each bidder.
• At date 2
4
, each bidder reports his bid in cartel’s prior auction.
• At date 3
4
, bidders update their beliefs through the cartel’s auction and vote for
or against the collusive mechanism.
• At date 1, if all bidders accepted the collusive mechanism at date 3
4
, the winner
in the prior auction represents the cartel to bid in the seller’s auction, and he
will compensate the losers with transfer payment. If at least one bidder rejects
the collusive mechanism, no collusion occurs. Bidders bid in the seller’s auction
at date 1 noncooperatively.
Definition 5 The information leakage problem is that all bidders can update their
information through the cartel’s prior auction before they participate in the seller’s
auction.
I assume that the efficient cartel designs a mechanism in order to maximize the
ex ante (before the valuations are known) sum of bidders’ expected profits, which
means that this cartel is self-enforcing without the monitor from a third party. I also
assume that when a bidder is indifferent between staying in and vetoing for the cartel,
he would choose to stay in the cartel.
Definition 6 The seller’s behavior is active, if she knows that she may face a collu-
sive mechanism.
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If the seller knows that she may face a cartel, she will have incentives to change
the reserve price to maximize her revenue. The reserve price is announced by the seller
at the beginning of the game, and she cannot change her price after announcement.
When the seller announces this reserve price, she is not sure if she faces a cartel as
the general setting.
In order to show that bidders may have incentive to jump out the cartel, I define
a vetoing condition. UMi (vi) and x
M
i (vi) are the expected utility and payment in the
cartel.
Definition 7 Bidder i will choose to veto for the cartel if the condition, UMi (vi) ≥
Ui(vi), is not satisfied, i.e., the expected payment x
M
i (vi) ≥ xi(vi).
The cartel mechanism is not sustainable if this vetoing condition is satisfied for
one of all bidders, that is, the noncollusive behavior can bring higher revenue to him.
3.2.3. Noncollusive Auction
In this part, I specify a benchmark case that bidders’ optimal strategies under
non-cooperative case. For any vector v−i, bidder i’s expected payment is:
xi(zi, vi) = vihi(zi, v−i)−
∫ vi
zi
hi(si, v−i)dsi.
∫ vi
zi
hi(si, v−i)dsi is the expected profit for the bidder.4 The optimal reporting value
is:
k(v−i) = inf{zi|zi ≥ v0 and zi ≥ vj, ∀j 6= i}.
4The probability of winning is F (zi)
n−1. In other words,
∫ vi
zi
hi(si, v−i)dsi =∫ vi
zi
F (si)
n−1dsi is the expected profit.
∫ 1
zi
∫ vi
zi
F (si)
n−1dsif(ti)dti =∫ 1
zi
∫ 1
vi
f(ti)dtiF (si)
n−1dsi =
∫ 1
zi
[1 − F (si)]F (si)n−1dsi is bidder i’s ex ante ex-
pected payoff.
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k(v−i) is the upper bound of other bidders’ possible bids. I can obtain
h(zi, v−i) =
 1 if zi > k(v−i)0 if zi < k(v−i),
and
xi(zi, vi) =
 k(v−i) if h(zi, v−i) = 10 if h(zi, v−i) = 0. (12)
The winner’s expected utility becomes:
Ui(zi, vi) = E−i[vih(zi, v−i)− k(v−i)]. (13)
3.3. Direct Revelation Mechanism with Reserve Price
The seller would not sell the object if bidders’ highest bid is less than v0, thus
I assume the reserve price r = v0 in Chapter 3.3.1, and release this assumption in
Chapter 3.3.2.
3.3.1. Bidders’ Optimal Strategy
In this part, I explore the optimal strategy for bidders when a cartel exists.
Consider bidders’ payoff in seller’s auction. The total transfer payment is5
T (vi) = F (vi)
−n
∫ vi
r
(si − r)(n− 1)F (si)n−1f(si)dsi, (14)
5As in McAfee and McMillan [17], T (·) is the total net transfer weighted by the
probability of winning. The probability that vi is the highest value among all bidders
is F (vi)
n. The expected difference between the winner’s possible bid and the reserve
price r is
∫ vi
r
(si − r)F (si)n−1f(si)dsi. There are (n− 1) losers in the cartel.
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which is the expected difference between the winner’s reporting value and the reserve
price. If winner i’s value is vi but he reports zi, his expected profit in the cartel is
UMi (zi, vi) = E−i[vih(zi, v−i)− T (zi)− r]. (15)
Since there is only one bidder in seller’s auction, he could bid the lowest price r and
win for sure. Note that if no one’s value is higher than the seller’s reserve price, the
cartel cannot be held, and no one will join the seller’s auction.
In this cartel mechanism, the expected payment function becomes
xMi (zi, vi) =
 T (zi) + r if hi(zi, v−i) = 1−T (zi)
n−1 if hi(zi, v−i) = 0.
(16)
Rewrite bidder i’s utility function:
UMi (zi, vi) = [vi − T (zi)− r]F (zi)n−1
+ [1− F (zi)n−1]
∫ 1
zi
T (si)
n− 1
(n− 1)F (si)n−2f(si)
1− F (zi)n−1 dsi
= [vi − T (zi)− r]F (zi)n−1 +
∫ 1
zi
T (si)F (si)
n−2f(si)dsi. (17)
The following lemma shows that the (IC) condition could be satisfied in the cartel.
Lemma 3 Given T (vi) the prior auction is incentive compatible and efficient.
From the lemma, I obtain
∂UMi (zi,vi)
∂zi
|zi=vi = 0, which means that in equilibrium,
everyone in the cartel would report their value truthfully.
For any given vector v−i, winner i’s expected profit in the cartel becomes:
UMi (vi) = E−i[vih(vi, v−i)− T (vi)− r]. (18)
30
Compared (13), (15) with (18), I come up with the following proposition.6
Proposition 3 Regardless of information leakage problem, if bidders report their true
values to the cartel, T (vi) + r− k(v−i) is always less than zero. Hence, bidders would
choose to stay in the cartel, and the bidding ring is formed.
If xi(zi, vi) in (16) is less than that in (12), winner i would have incentive to
participate in the cartel mechanism with UMi (vi) ≥ Ui(vi), because the winner is
paying less than in non-cartel case.
3.3.2. Seller’s Optimal Strategy
The seller’s problem is to consider all possible values of buyers and try to max-
imize her expected revenue. The seller’s objective function in (7) can be rewritten
as:
U0 =
∫
V
rf(v)dv+
∑
i∈n
∫
V
hi(v)(vi−r)f(v)dv+
∑
i∈n
∫
V
(xi(v)−vihi(v))f(v)dv. (19)
I can simplify the seller’s objective function with the following lemma.
Lemma 4 With condition Ui(vi) = Ui(zi) +
∫ vi
zi
Mi(si)dsi, seller’s problem can be
simplified to be
max
∫
V
[
∑
i∈n
(vi − r − 1− F (vi)
f(vi)
)hi(v)]f(v)dv. (20)
Based on this lemma, let
d(vi) = vi − 1− F (vi)
f(vi)
, (21)
6The proof is in Appendix B.
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where 1−F (vi)
f(vi)
is the expected information rent earned by the winner i.7 d(vi) is the
virtual valuation of a buyer with value vi.
8
There are two possibilities. One is when seller’s reserve price is too high to sell
the object, that is, r > maxi∈n vi. In this case, the seller keeps the object because the
seller’s utility is less than zero if she sells. While the other case is that, at least one
bidder’s value is higher than seller’s reserve price, i.e., r ≤ maxi∈n vi, and she gives
the object to the bidder with the highest value (thus the highest vi − 1−F (vi)f(vi) ). The
seller’s problem becomes
max
∫
V
(
∑
i∈n
(d(vi)− r)hi(v))f(v)dv. (22)
According to Proposition 3, bidders would choose to join the ring. When the
seller announces the reserve price at v0, she earns v0. Thus, from (22), the optimal
strategy for her becomes:9
r = d−1(v0), (23)
where d−1(·) is an inverse function of d(·).
In noncollusive auction case, the best price for the seller to sell the object is at
k(v−i) = maxj 6=ivj. When cartel exists, there is only one bidder joining the seller’s
auction and he submits his bid at the seller’s reserve price. For the seller, the only
strategy to maximize her revenue is to raise the reserve price according to d−1(v0).
7 1−F (vi)
f(vi)
is an index of the winning bidder’s payoff. ∂
∂vi
1−F (vi)
f(vi)
> 0 means that the
bidder with higher value earns relatively higher payoff, and ∂
∂vi
1−F (vi)
f(vi)
≤ 0 implies
that the higher value bidder receives relatively less payoff.
8As in Krishna [13], for all i, E[d(vi)] = 0.
9This result is similar as in Myerson [19], when the assumption: “when the seller
announces this reserve price, she is not sure if she faces a cartel.” holds. If the
cartel exists before the seller’s announcement, the optimal reserve price for her is
r = zi + (n− 1)
∫ zi
r
F (si)
ndsi, which is shown in the proof of proposition 3.
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Due to asymmetric information, she does not know the true values of the bidders’.
It is impossible for her to set up the reserve price exactly at either the highest or the
second highest value among bidders. If no one’s value is higher than the reserve price,
she will keep the object. This implies that the efficiency may not always be held. I
use the following proposition to summarize this result.10
Proposition 4 If the seller is active,
(a) she can set the reserve price r according to d−1(v0) ≥ v0 to maximize
her expected payoff.
(b) The cartel mechanism could still be held when d−1(v0) ≤ vh, i.e.,
T (vi) + r− k(v−i) ≤ 0. If d−1(v0) > vh, I have T (vi) + r− k(v−i) > 0.
Thus, the winner i has no incentive to stay in the cartel. The ring
breaks down.
(c) The efficient condition may not be held, i.e., d−1(v0) > vh. The object
is not sold to the bidder with the highest value, which is less than the
reserve price.
From this proposition, the cartel mechanism is sustainable when the seller is
active. I use an example to illustrate the main idea. Suppose there are one seller
and two bidders. Agent i = 1, 2 can bid the object at their own value vi, which is
drawn uniformly from [0, 1]. If the agents are not allowed to collude, it is optimal
for the seller to use an auction, such as a second-price auction. The bidder with the
higher value wins and gets the object with a payment that equals to the lower bid.
In our model, if the seller’s value is v0 = 0, I have d(vi) = vi − 1−F (vi)f(vi) = 2vi − 1,
which is an increasing function of vi. Suppose now the agents can collude, the second-
price auction would be affected by the collusion. Before the seller’s auction, bidders
10The proof is in Appendix B.
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can organize a knockout auction in which agents bid for the right to participate in
seller’s auction; i.e., the winner bids the seller’s reserve price and he would win the
auction for sure. With collusion, the seller can only receive the reserve price from
the winner. Thus, the optimal strategy for the seller is to set the reserve price equal
to d−1(v0) = 1/2, and there is a probability of (1/2)2 that the object will not be
sold even if someone’s value is higher than the seller’s original value 0. Her expected
payoff becomes 3/8, which is greater than her value 0. This is why the efficiency may
not hold, yet the cartel may be sustained, and the seller’s optimal strategy helps to
maximize her expected payoff.
3.4. Direct Revelation Mechanism with Residual Claimants Method and
Participation Costs
In Chapter 3.3, the only tool that the seller can use is the reserve price. When
the seller raises the price, it may lead to inefficiency of the auction. In Chapter
3.4, I allow the seller to change the auction mechanism with two methods: residual
claimants method and participation costs, in which the seller is able to earn expected
profit and an auction is always efficient.
3.4.1. Residual Claimants Method
I use “robustly collusion-proof (RCP)” to specify our idea.
Definition 8 A mechanism M ∈ M is RCP, if every mechanism M˜ in the subset
of MM can give the same expected payoff to the principal as the original mechanism
M .
MM is the set of reallocational manipulation that satisfies (IR) and (IC) conditons.
This RCP is presented in Che and Kim [3](from now on, CK). Their idea is that, when
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a RCP mechanism manipulates the outcome of the original mechanism, the principal
could receive an ex post constant surplus at first, which guarantees the same expected
payoff for the seller, and the bidders become residual claimants of the entire surplus.
Bidders in the cartel could receive a higher payoff because of the distortion re-
sulted from asymmetric information between the bidders and the seller. This asym-
metric information induces an information rent from the seller which must be given
to the members of the collusion. When the seller can be paid first to extract the
information rent, any other allocation designed by the collusion will not affect seller’s
surplus. Based on the CK model, when the seller can use other mechanism to replace
the original mechanism, this new mechanism could still bring the same expected pay-
off to the seller if it is RCP mechanism. A new mechanism is likely to prevent the ring
from being formed, and guarantee that the efficient condition holds. Thus, I have the
following proposition:11
Proposition 5 Based on the residual claimants method, if the optimal expected pay-
off level is implementable, there exists a RCP mechanism that implements the non-
collusive optimal payoff for the seller, and bidders have no incentive to form a ring.
Making bidders the residual claimant is a strategy to prevent collusion. I continue
to use the example from Chapter 3.3.2 to illustrate the idea. The seller’s optimal
strategy is to set the reserve price equal to 1/2 and earn an expected payoff 3/8. If
the seller can replace the auction mechanism with a different payment arrangement,
the result is different. First, the seller received her optimal reserve price 1/2 from the
loser after the auction, then the winner pays his bid to the loser. In this case, the
winner still pays his bid in the auction, but the loser has incentives to make the winner
pay as much as possible. In other words, the loser’s payoff becomes the difference
11The proof is in Appendix B.
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between bi− 1/2, where bi is winner i’s bid; thus the loser would like to maximize his
payoff by maximizing winner’s bid. If bidders know this new payment mechanism,
they have no incentive to collude. Since the bidder (loser) who is appointed to pay
the reserve price to the seller, acting like a third party authority, always has incentive
to betray the cartel. He monitors the other bidder’s bid in order to maximize his own
payoff.
However, this residual claimants method may not be able to prevent the forma-
tion of a ring if there is only one bidder in the seller’s auction. According to our
setting, when the ring is formed, there is only one bidder joining the seller’s auction.
Even if she can extract her expected revenue from this single participant, bidders may
still have incentive to form a ring.12
Proposition 6 The residual claimants method in CK model is not able to prevent the
cartel if the seller cannot extract her expected payoff from non-participating bidders.
When at least two bidders’ values are higher than seller’s reserve price, the cartel
would be held. In the cartel, bidders can make transfer payments among themselves.
The winner in the cartel could earn more profit than that of not in the cartel, because
the transfer payment is positive. When there is only one bidder’s value higher than
the reserve price, he is indifferent between staying in and vetoing for the cartel because
his transfer payment is zero. According to our assumption, in equal profit case, the
winner would choose to stay in the cartel. Therefore, when there is information
leakage problem with no participation costs, the cartel mechanism is sustainable.
Consider the case that the seller is allowed to extract her expected payoff from
other bidders. The appointed bidder pays seller’s expected payoff to the seller first.
If he chooses to jump out of the cartel, he could place a bid in the seller’s auction
12The proof is in Appendix B.
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to threat the winner to bid as much as possible because he has already updated his
information through the cartel’s auction.13 Based on this condition, I consider the
following two cases. First, there is only one bidder’s value higher than the seller’s
reserve price. In this case, this bidder would bid the reserve price to the seller in
the second-price auction, and the loser’s payoff becomes zero. The other case is that
there are at least two bidders’ values higher than seller’s reserve price. The loser’s
payoff of jumping out of the cartel is higher than that of staying in the cartel. Once
he jumps out of the cartel, the cartel collapses. Bidders will bid in seller’s auction
noncooperatively. Hence, if the seller can influence nonparticipants, the residual
claimants method can prevent the cartel.
3.4.2. Participation Costs
The residual claimants method is not the only method to prevent the collusion.
In Hsueh and Tian [12] paper, I show that if both information leakage problem and
participation costs exist, bidders do not have incentives to form a ring. If the seller
can set a positive participation cost, no matter how small it is, the highest-value
bidder does not have incentive to stay in the cartel. There are two reasons for the
winner to veto for the cartel.
(1) After the prior auction, the winner knows that no one has higher value
than his. If he is the only one bidder participating in the auction, he
can pay the reserve price plus the participation costs and win this
auction for sure.
(2) All other bidders know who has the highest bid in the cartel after
13Note that bidders do not bid higher than their own values, which can be erased
easily by a trembling hand equilibrium.
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prior auction. If the winner of the prior auction places his bid in
seller’s auction, other bidders will lose. After updating their belief,
no one wants to join the auction because they would lose the auction
for sure and have to pay the non-refundable participation cost, which
ends up with negative profits.
If the seller is allowed to change the auction mechanism, either the residual
claimants method or positive participation costs, she can prevent a ring. Note that
in residual claimant method, the loser may have incentives to jump out of the cartel;
while with a positive participation cost, it is the winner who has incentives to veto
for the cartel. If the seller can give higher revenue to cartel members, no matter it is
the winner or the loser, the cartel is no longer sustainable.
3.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I explore two assumptions about the seller’s behavior in an
efficient cartel mechanism. When the seller is active, she may change the result of
the cartel mechanism in many cases.
When the seller’s type is passive, I find that the cartel mechanism is sustainable,
regardless of information leakage problem. Suppose that the seller can detect collusive
bidders, the only tool to increase her revenue is to raise the reserve price. When the
information leakage problem exists, the cartel mechanism is still sustainable.
Additionally, I examine two methods that the seller can use to prevent the car-
tel. When I focus on the sustainability of the cartel mechanism, I discover that the
residual claimants method defined in Che and Kim [3] is not effective in decomposing
cartel, since the seller cannot force non-participants. However, if the seller can set
up participation costs as Hsueh and Tian [12], the winner will have incentive to veto
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when information leakage problem exists. To sum up, when the seller is authorized
to change the auction mechanism, she may deter the collusive behavior.
In next chapter, I study whether a third-party authority helps to prevent a
cartel, when the seller’s behavior is passive and no participation cost exists. From
the residual claimants method, if there is a third-party in the economy, the cartel
mechanism may collapse. The cartel mechanism described in this chapter, is designed
to be self-enforcement and with no punishment. If there is a third party authority who
can help to monitor and punish, the result may be different. It would be interesting
to investigate the optimal strategy for the authority to prevent a cartel.
39
CHAPTER IV
DIFFERENTIATE COLLUSIVE MECHANISM WITH THE GOVERNMENT
4.1. Introduction
When a ring is formed, it usually comes with huge amount of financial benefit for
the members but brings loss to the economy. A cartel makes secret decisions to boost
prices, share production information and then make high prices sticky. In reality,
the collusive problem often takes place in an industry with heterogeneous firms and
private information. When there is collusion, it usually reduces market competition
and erodes consumers’ welfare.
Although a cartel is prohibited by law in many countries, it is difficult to detect
collusive behavior in the real world. If the government could not detect collusive
behavior, is there a mechanism that can give the members enough incentives to veto
for the cartel? Or, how does the government differentiate collusive behavior? Osborne
[20] and McAfee and McMillan [17] point out that a successful cartel has to overcome
many obstacles. If I can enhance the effects of these obstacles, it is easier for the
government to prevent the formation of a ring. In the literatures on organization
structure, the external threats might distort the internal efficient structure. In the
literatures of efficient selling mechanism, like McAfee and McMillan [17] and Tan and
Yilankaya [24], they establish a set of conditions for the formation of a ring. However,
they consider about buyers’ and seller’s behavior in an auction without a third party
authority. If this authority, like the government, is allowed to exist in the economy,
the bidders’ collusive decisions may be different.
Osborne [20] claims that a cartel faces one external and four internal problems.
The external problem is to predict and discourage production by outsiders. The four
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internal problems are designing the contract, solving the sharing problem, detecting,
and deterring cheating. He mentions that even if a cartel can solve these problems,
it does not guarantee a stable cartel. A cartel breaks down because it cannot control
external production or detect cheating. McAfee and McMillan [17] also indicate
that a successful cartel must overcome four obstacles. First, the conspirators must
design some mechanism to partition the revenue, because members have incentives to
contend for more revenue. Second, all collusive contracts should be self enforcement.
Third, the high profits earned in a cartel provide incentives for new firms to join in.
The competition resulted from these new firms would distort the revenue allocation.
Fourth, the losers of the cartel may try to destabilize it. Due to the above conditions,
an efficient colluding mechanism is not freely implemented.
Cramton and Palfrey [5] find that, when private information exists, a cartel
agreement is possible in the economy. Given incentives and participation constraints,
they characterize a series of applicable contracts. If a cartel is sustainable without
unanimous agreements, the incentive problem can be avoided in a large cartel. When
uncertainty exists, regardless of the ratification rule, a perfect collusion is possible in
a large cartel. Porter [21] empirically tests cartel’s stability with weekly time series
data on the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel; he proposes that observed
prices reflected switches from collusive to noncollusive behavior from 1880 to 1886.
The hypothesis that no change in the price, is rejected in the paper.
In this chapter, I use the methodology in the literatures of organization structure
to specify the government’s role in efficient cartel mechanism. As the synthesis of
standard mechanism design literatures, McAfee and McMillan [17] point out that the
efficient collusive mechanism cannot be implemented with no cost. They explore the
bidding strategies in first-price sealed-bid auction and show that when members can
exclude new entrants and make transfer payments among themselves, the optimal
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cartel mechanism can reach the efficiency by implementing a prior auction. Tan and
Yilankaya [24] show that the efficient collusive mechanism with independent private
values is not ratifiable in second-price auction with positive participation costs and
information leakage problem.
In organization structure literatures, there is a group of papers dealing with the
impact of a third party authority on the cartel’s behavior. Ben-Porath and Kahneman
[1] study a repeated game. If only a subset of the agents can observe all others’
behavior, they show that, “two” agents are sufficient to achieve efficient payoff with
the discount factor closing to 1. Garupa [7] investigates the organizational problem.
He focuses on the optimal size of the illegal organization given its internal structure.
He shows the trade off between increasing internal productivity and leaving members
exposed to be detected. Waldman [25] and Ricart-I-Costa [22] consider what affects
internal efficiency. They show that the external considerations might distort the most
internal efficient structure. Harrington [9, 10, 11] examines the effect of the external
shock from a third party authority on the cartel’s optimal pricing behavior.
This chapter investigates the government’s strategy in destabilizing a cartel and
hindering the formation of a cartel. I explore the allocation of government’s budget
that entitles to regulate collusive behavior in a repeated game. In some cases, allo-
cating the budget among firms equally may lead to a collapse of collusive mechanism.
In other cases, however, symmetric allocation may induce the agents to form a ring.
How the government optimizes its budget allocation to prevent collusive behavior
becomes an important question.
I also have a concern on whether the government should choose exemption or
subsidy. If the exemption (it could be a premium or punishment) is large enough,
members in a cartel may have incentives to veto, and outsiders may not participate in
the collusive mechanism. On the other hand, an individual firm that receives subsidy
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from the government, is likely to earn more profit and thus not to participate in
a collusive mechanism. Exemption is usually restrained by law and it is costly to
change. Compared with exemption, subsidy is more applicable in reality.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Chapter 4.2, I present a general
setting of economic environment and introduce the stage game. In Chapter 4.3, I
investigate different reactions of members under different conditions and the optimal
strategy for the government to detect the collusive behavior. In Chapter 4.4, I il-
lustrate our main idea with a two stage model. Concluding remarks are provided in
Chapter 4.5. All proofs are in the Appendix C.
4.2. Model
Suppose there are N ≥ 2 risk-neutral players, and a third party authority, that is,
the government. The N players have the probability of forming a collusive mechanism
by exchanging information. Players do not know others’ exchanging decisions when
they make theirs. After forming a ring, the N agents play an infinitely repeated stage
game.
4.2.1. Detection
The government announces a monitor strategy at beginning. Each agent could be
detected by the government at each period of the stage game. If one agent is detected,
he has to pay a fine e > 0. Agents can be detected by two ways: a direct way and an
indirect way. At each period, the probability that agent i is detected directly by the
government is αit. Agents being detected at each period is uncorrelated with others’
detection and previous history. αit depends on whether or not the agent colludes
with others at time t and on the monitor strategy of the government’s action βi. The
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government has a budget B ∈ [0, N ] to allocate to the N members of the collusion
and devotes βi ∈ [0, 1] to detecting member i, where
∑N
i=1 βi ≤ B. The probability
that agent i is detected directly at t is αit = βi if the agent colludes in t.
The government can also detect collusive agents indirectly. I assume that when
the government is able to detect an agent with information about other members in
the cartel, the probability that the government can detect other members is 1. If
agent i has information about agent j within information structure Vt ∈ V and i is
detected, agent j will be surely detected. Given information structure Vt and directly
detected probabilities α1, ..., αN , agent i is detected if and only if at least one agent
in Vt is detected in period t. Vt can be perfectly observed by each players in the
collusion but the government.
Based on the assumption above, agent i is detected by the government with
probability 1−∏j∈Vt(1− αj).
4.2.2. Stage Game
After exchanging information, agents play an infinitely repeated stage game.
Agents can choose to collude (C) or not collude (NC) at beginning of every period.
The choice set of the stage game for player i is Ai = [C,NC] for i = 1, ..., N . Collusion
increases the sum of the revenue to the agents, but it costs c to the agent who colludes.
In particular, if N − 1 other agents collude, the payoff of an agent is λN − c if he
cooperates, and λ(N − 1) if he does not, with λ, c > 0.
I assume c < λ, which implies that colluding is a dominant strategy for player i in
the stage game, and that λN > c, which implies that full colluding is the most efficient
outcome of the collusion. Suppose that player i has revealed his information to player
j in Vt, which means that the player i is colluding with player j, this revelation makes
player i vulnerable to player j. The timing of the game is as follows:
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(1) The government allocates [β1, ..., βN ], which is common knowledge to
each agent.
(2) Each agent chooses to collude or not with the others. The information
set Vt ∈ V arises.
(3) Given the set V1, V2, ...., the stage game described above is played
infinite times at periods t = 1, 2, .... At every period agents simulta-
neously choose whether to collude or not collude. And each agent is
likely to be directly detected (with probability α1, ..., αN) by the gov-
ernment if the agent chooses to collude. If detected (either directly or
indirectly), he has to pay a fine e.
hit denotes the history in period t for agent i in the repeated game. Let Hi
denote the set of histories for individual i. If agent i participates in the cartel at t,
he observes Vt, where Vt ∈ hit, and his payoff would be affected by other members’
behavior. If he does not join the ring at t, Vt /∈ hit, and his payoff at t would not be
affected by others. Player i′s strategy is denoted as si : Hi → Ai. Given the agents’
behavior s(hit) at period t, player i
′s payoff in t is:
piit(s(h
i
t)) = λn(s(h
i
t))− c1it − e[1−
∏
j∈Vt
(1− αj(s(hit)))], (24)
where n(s(hit)) denotes the number of players colluding at time t under s(h
i
t). 1
i
t is
a bernoulli variable that takes the value 1 if agent i colludes at t and 0 otherwise.
Thus, from (24), if there is no government in this economy, the maximum revenue for
the player i is λN − c.
piit(s(h
i
t)) can be divided into an internal part and an external part. λn(s(h
i
t))−c1it
is the revenue from the interaction among the N agents in the stage game. It is
independent of the fine upon detection. e[1−∏j∈Vt(1− αj(s(hit)))] is the per-period
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information leakage cost for agent i with the information set Vt, and agent i will
choose to collude with agent j, given j’s probability of detection βj, if
λn(s(hit))− c > maxi[βie+ (1− βi)βje] (25)
stands, which means the revenue for agent i to collude should be higher than his
maximum information leakage cost.
Suppose discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), pii(s) =∑∞t=0 δtpiit(s(hit)). Finally, the overall
payoff of the cartel in period t is Πt(s) =
∑N
i=1 pi
i
t(s).
4.3. Strategies
Following the model, we investigate the government’s and players’ strategies.
4.3.1. Government’s Strategy
The government’s goal is to prevent the collusion among the N agents. At each
period t, the total revenue of all cartel members is Πt(s). The government aims to
minimize
∑∞
t=0 δ
tΠt(s). For simplicity, I assume that the government receives no
utility from saving part of the budget B. Also, the government does not benefit from
the payment e.
I focus on the government’s strategy in how to allocate [β1, ...βN ] before the
exchange of information in order to minimize
∑∞
t=0 δ
tΠt(s). Under our setting, a
larger number of colluding agents with agent i would lead to a higher probability of
agent i’s indirect detection. If agent i colludes, his information leakage cost has a
lower bound at eβi, where eβi is the expected fine for which agent i has to pay under
the case of direct detection. Thus, the government could take advantage of this fact,
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as in the following lemma:1
Lemma 5 By allocation βi =
Nλ−c
e
, the government can always prevent agent i from
colluding.
Using this result, I can characterize the optimal strategy for the government.2
Proposition 7 The optimal strategy for the government is to allocate the budget
βi =
Nλ−c
e
among |B e
Nλ−c | agents; if there is excess budget, the government should
use the remaining budget to one of the other players, and to spend nothing on all
others.
Suppose B ≥ 2Nλ−c
e
. In this case, it is possible to allocate βi = βj =
Nλ−c
e
to at
least two agents i and j and prevent them from colluding. If there is some agent l
with βl <
Nλ−c
e
, agent l will choose to collude with other agents. Therefore, allocating
Nλ−c
e
to as many agents as possible is the optimal strategy for the government.
This proposition states the optimal strategy for the government to monitor a
cartel with no more than |B e
Nλ−c | agents. This means that the government can dis-
courage these agents from colluding by allocating Nλ−c
e
to as many agents as possible.
Thus, the higher level of B and e and the lower Nλ − c, the less likely is collusive
behavior.
Corollary 1 In an efficient all-inclusive cartel mechanism, which is sustainable with
unanimous agreement among all agents, when B ≥ Nλ−c
e
, the government can prevent
the cartel by allocating βi =
Nλ−c
e
to one of the agents.
1The proof is in Appendix C.
2The proof is in Appendix C.
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4.3.2. Player’s Strategy
Given the government’s strategy, when B = Nλ−c
e
, the government will allocate
its budget fully to agent i and βi =
Nλ−c
e
. The optimal strategy for player i is not to
collude with others, and also other players have no incentive to collude with player i.
In this case, I have Nλ− c < eβi + (1− βi)eβj.
For other player j 6= i, because the government spends all budget on player
i, [β1, ..., βi−1, βi+1, ..., βN ] = [0, ..., 0, 0, ...0]. From (24), player j’s revenue equal to
λ(N−1)−c if he colludes, and λ(N−2) if not collude. Because c < λ, λ(N−1)−c ≥
λ(N − 2). Therefore, All bidders other than agent i choose to collude.
When B < Nλ−c
e
, from Proposition 1, the government’s strategy is to spend all
budget on player i. From (25), the information leakage cost for player i is eβi < Nλ−c.
Thus, if λn(s(hit)) > eβi, all other bidders still have incentive to collude with player i.
If all bidders choose to collude, the revenue for each bidder is Nλ− c, which is higher
than eβi. The collusion is sustainable in this case. I use the following proposition to
specify this result.3
Proposition 8 The optimal strategy for the players is to collude with player j when
0 ≤ βj < Nλ−ce ,∀j ∈ N , and not to collude with player i when βi = Nλ−ce ,∀i ∈ N .
In this part, I investigate how to achieve external efficiency in a repeated game.
In particular, I look into the allocation of the budget that allows the authority, like
the government, to differentiate collusive behavior and to expose agents to external
threat. In some cases, allocating the budget symmetrically gives no incentive to
the agents to exchange information. However, in other cases a symmetric allocation
induces the agents to form a ring. I find out a threshold level of payment for an
3The proof is in Appendix C.
48
incentive compatible collusive mechanism for which the government can prevent an
agent from participating in the cartel.
4.4. An Application: A Two-Stage Model
In this part, I use a two-stage model to show that the government’s action can
help to differentiate the collusion. Consider a standard, two-period decision-making
framework, where agents know the present but face an uncertain future. In the first
period, there is one decision node. In the second period, one of three possible states
occurs; a good state, indexed g, a bad state, indexed b, and a financial crisis state,
indexed f . Each state corresponds to a decision node, and the probability of each
state is θg, θb, and θf , respectively, with θg + θb + θf = 1.
There are one government and N firms in this economy. m denotes the number of
firms in the collusive mechanism. The government can provide subsidy to individual
firm, and the limit is controlled by the government. The government has two tools
to prevent collusive behavior. One is exemption, specified by e, the other is subsidy
di to firm i, i = 1, ..., N , and di ≤ d¯ ∀i. A firm i in a collusive mechanism has to
decide her bid at each node; her bidding strategy is indexed λi0, λig, λib, and λif . The
more she bids, the more she earns. Moreover, subsidy is available for her at a one-
period, risk-adjusted market and the interest rate is denoted by r. As usual, a single
bidder takes interest rate as given. Her endowment in bidding units at each node is
denoted by wi0, wig, wib, and wif . (For convenience, suppose wi0 = 0, and 0 < wif <
wib < wig.) Moreover, she has to decide how much subsidy, di, to take, subjected
to some exogenously specified subsidy limit. Her twice continuously differentiable
profit function is denoted by pii(λi) with pi
′
i(λi) > 0, pi
′′
i (λi) < 0, limλi→0 pi
′
i(λi) =
∞, limλi→∞ pii(λi) =∞. Her expected profit is pii(λi) = 1m
∑m
i=1{pii(λi0)+δ[θgpii(λig)+
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θbpii(λib) + θfpii(λif )]}.
Any firm is a rational bidder who includes veto as an option in her profit-
maximizing problem. In period 1, she plans for states g, b, and f . Suppose 0 <
wif < wib ≤ e < wig. That is, exemptions are sufficiently high to have non-negative
financial benefit from vetoing in bad and crisis states, but not necessarily in a good
state. I specify the assumption about the exemption 0 < wif < wib ≤ e < wig. If e
is larger than wig, no one wants to join the ring because the non-negative financial
benefit from vetoing for the ring is high enough. If e is between wib and wif , the
exemption is too small to for the individual to stay out the ring unless a crisis state
occurs. The government should be able to provide enough incentive to betray the
cartel at least in bad state, which is more reasonable.
In each state of the second period, the bidder has an option to veto for the cartel,
and solves the following problem.
max
di,λi0,λig ,λib,λif
pii(λi) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
{pii(λi0) + δ[θgpii(λig) + θbpii(λib) + θfpii(λif )]}
subject to λi0 = di
λig = max(wig − (1 + r)di,min(wig, e))
λib = max(wib − (1 + r)di,min(wib, e))
λit = max(wif − (1 + r)di,min(wif , e))
di ≤ d¯
In order to simplify calculation, I elide the subscript i. 4 For firms, the maximum
operator for decision nodes is the second period corresponds to the vetoing decision.
For example, if a member decides not to veto in g, her constraint is wg − (1 + r)d,
4After eliding the subscript i, m becomes a constant term for the optimizing
problem. Thus, we also elide m.
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and if she decides to veto, her constraint is e. In order to show the optimization
problem, I have to define a point d∗ and to show that there exists a unique d∗, such
that the firm can maximize her profit at this point.5 MP (d) is the marginal profit of
individual firm.
Lemma 6 There is a unique d ≡ d∗ > 0 such that MP (d∗) = 0.
Now I want to solve the optimization problem for a firm. In state g, the optimal
decision of a firm can be characterized as follows.
pi(veto, d) = pi(d) + δ[θgpi(e) + θbpi(wb) + θfpi(wf )]
pi(not, d) = pi(d) + δ[θgpi(wg − (1 + r)d) + θbpi(wb) + θfpi(wf )]
where pi(veto, d) is the profit for her to veto for the cartel, and pi(not, d) is the profit
she stays in the cartel.
Consider the action of not vetoing. After comparing d∗ with the subsidy limit d¯,
I can get the following proposition:6
Proposition 9 If a cartel member considers not to veto, maximum possible profit
when subsidy limit is d¯ is as follows:
• if d¯ ≤ d∗, maximum profit is pi(not, d¯) = pi(d¯)+ δ[θgpi(wg− (1+r)d¯)+θbpi(wb)+
θfpi(wf )],
• if d¯ > d∗, maximum profit is pi(not, d∗) = pi(d∗) + δ[θgpi(wg − (1 + r)d∗) +
θbpi(wb) + θfpi(wf )].
I can see that different d¯ may influence the profit level of the firm, and this can also
influence the optimal decision for her to veto or not to veto.
5The proof is in Appendix C.
6The proof is in Appendix C.
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Consider the action of vetoing. Here I have to define a dˆ which solves wg − (1 +
r)dˆ = e.
Definition 9 dˆ = wg−e
1+r
is a threshold value, which means that at dˆ, the bidder is
financially indifferent between vetoing and not vetoing for the cartel.
Now, I can consider the level of d¯, dˆ, and d∗. The difference between these three
variables would influence the member’s decision. After comparison, I get the following
proposition:7
Proposition 10 Consider cartel member’s action of optimal decision:
1. Suppose d¯ ≤ dˆ. e = wg − (1 + r)dˆ ≤ wg − (1 + r)d¯. Then the firm’s optimal
decision is not to veto in g, which means pi(not, d∗) ≥ pi(not, d¯) ≥ pi(veto, d¯).
2. Suppose the case d¯ > dˆ. e = wg − (1 + r)dˆ > wg − (1 + r)d¯. Then the optimal
vetoing decision depends on the tradeoff between exemptions and net wealth after
paying off endogenously determined subsidy use.
• If dˆ ≤ d∗, the optimal decision is to veto.
• If dˆ > d∗, there is a unique d¯∗, such that dˆ < d¯∗. If dˆ < d¯ < d¯∗, optimal
decision is to not veto; and if d¯∗ < d¯, optimal decision is to veto.
In this part, I specify the individual firm’s behavior. In two-stage model, mem-
bers include betraying the cartel as an option in all cases in order to maximize their
own profit. They can choose different actions at different time nodes. At each time
node, members in the mechanism place a bid, like an all-pay auction. Everyone pays
her own bid to the mechanism. Then the mechanism distributes its revenue to all
7The proof is in Appendix C.
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members according to their share of total bids. The more they bid, the more they
earn.
The government can give more offer to cartel members to achieve the goal of
differentiating the collusive mechanism. The intuition is that a cartel member could
choose to receive more subsidy from the government to enhance her profit in the
market. Furthermore, in our model, there are two tools to differentiate the collusion.
One is exemption e and the other is subsidy limit d¯. Both tools can be used to achieve
the goal. If the government can boost exemption or have more budget to subsidize
agents, it is less likely that a ring will be formed. Subsidizing the agents is a good
strategy for the government with more budget to reduce collusive behavior. Or, if
the exemption is high enough, no one will choose to participate in a ring, and thus
collusive behavior will never happen. e, the punishment or the premium, is defined
by law. If I need to use e to achieve the goal, the cost to legislate or amend a law is
huge. In reality, d¯ is controlled by the government. It is less costly to change d¯ than
e. Given the budget, the government can determine the subsidy limit d¯ to decide the
subsidy amount to each firm.
4.5. Conclusion
Collusive behavior often comes with asymmetric information. When there is
collusion, the market usually suffers from huge economic loss. In recent antitrust
case of TFT-LCD industry, AUO, Chi-Mei, LG, Samsung, and Sharp have around
75 percentage market share in TFT-LCD industry 2006. The defendants and their
co-conspirators control over 90 percent of this multi-billion dollar market. These
firms earn billions in profit due to the fact that conspirators suppress and eliminate
competition by fixing the prices of TFT-LCD panels. It is difficult to detect collusive
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mechanism in the real world. Thus, I need to investigate some mechanism for the
government to detect, differentiate, and prohibit collusive behavior.
I investigate how to achieve external efficiency in a repeated game. In particular,
I look into the allocation of the budget that allows the government, to differentiate
collusive behavior and to expose agents to external threat. I define members’ behavior
in a collusive mechanism, and find out the government’s strategy to prevent the
collusion. The government’s goal is to optimize budget allocation to lessen collusive
behavior. In some cases, allocating the budget symmetrically gives no incentive to
the agents to exchange information. However, in other cases, a symmetric allocation
induces the agents to form a ring. I find out a threshold level of payment for an
incentive compatible collusive mechanism for which the government can prevent an
agent from participating the mechanism. If the government can boost premium or
have more budget to subsidize agents, it is less likely that the ring will be formed.
Subsidizing the agents is a good strategy for the government with more budget to
reduce collusive behavior. Or, if the premium is high enough, no one will choose to
participate in a ring and thus collusive behavior will never happen.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
As mentioned in McAfee and McMillan [17], an illegal cartel’s agreement is worth-
less without some way to enforce it, since contracts to fix prices usually cannot be
written. When members’ individual rational condition and incentive compatible con-
straint could not be satisfied, the efficient colluding mechanism is not freely imple-
mented. When bidders’ actions are strategically interactive and their outcome is
affected by bidders’ belief about others’ values, the standard mechanism design ap-
proach may suffer from information leakage problem. In Chapter II, the efficient
cartel mechanism is no longer sustainable in the presence of positive participation
costs and information leakage problem. The bidder with the highest value would
choose to veto for the collusive mechanism. This behavior could maximize his benefit
and leave all others with zero profit.
In Chapter III, I investigate the seller’s behavior in an efficient cartel mechanism.
When the seller is active, the only tool to increase her revenue is to raise the reserve
price. When the information leakage problem exists, the cartel mechanism is still
sustainable. Additionally, I examine two methods that the seller can use to prevent
the cartel. The residual claimants method defined in Che and Kim [3] is not effective,
since the seller cannot force non-participants. However, if the seller can set up a
positive participation cost as in Chapter II, the winner will have incentive to veto
when information leakage problem exists.
In Chapter IV, I investigate how to achieve external efficiency in a repeated game,
and specify the government’s role in the efficient cartel mechanism. In particular, I
look into the allocation of the budget that allows the government to differentiate col-
lusive behavior and to expose agents to external threat. The result is that allocating
55
the budget among firms equally may lead to a collapse of collusive mechanism in some
cases. While in others, a symmetric allocation induces the agents to form a ring. I
find out a threshold level of payment for an incentive compatible collusive mechanism
for which the government can prevent an agent from participating the mechanism.
I also have concern on whether the government should choose exemption or subsidy
to destabilize the collusive behavior. My conclusion is that if the exemption is high
enough, members in a cartel would veto for the cartel, and outsiders may not partici-
pate in the collusive mechanism. On the other hand, an individual firm that receives
subsidy from the government, is likely to earn more profit and thus not has incentives
to participate in a collusive mechanism.
For future research, there are two possibilities worth considering. One is different
information structure setting. In this dissertation, the information structure is perfect
observed by members. With a different information structure setting, the optimal
outcome for the cartel may change. It may also affect members’ decision whether
staying in or jumping out of the collusive mechanism. The other is to introduce bribe
in the model. If the cartel can bribe the bank or the government (politician), I may
have to pay more social cost to differentiate the collusive behavior, and it would be
interesting to see the result.
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APPENDIX A
TECHNICAL PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1. In this chapter, I assume homogeneous valuation among
bidders.1 With this assumption, I find the relationship between bi and bj when
vi = vj. In order to avoid the confusion of the effect between vi and vj, I substitute
this assumption in our model at the end of this proof. When vetoer i vetoes the
cartel, there could be three possible cases. The first case is that viG(vY ) ≤ c, i.e.,
his expected payoff is less than his participation costs. No matter other bidders
participate in seller’s auction or not, the vetoer will not join the auction. The second
case is that c ≤ viG(vY ) ≤ vYG(vY ). The vetoer chooses to participate in seller’s
auction because his expected payoff is larger than c. The third case is that vi ≥ vY .
His expected profit is his expected payoff minus his participation costs. These three
cases can be written as follows:
pivi (vi) =

0 vi ≤ cG(vY )
viG(vY )− c cG(vY ) ≤ vi ≤ vY
viH(vi)− λ(vi)H(vi)− c vi > vY .
The expected profit in the cartel is:
pimi (vi) =
 pi
m
i (0) vi < c.
pimi (0) +
∫ vi
c
G(y)dy vi ≥ c.
I want to show:
pivi (vi) ≥ pimi (vi) ∀vi ≥ vN .
1In Tan and Yilankaya [24] paper, they use this assumption to show that the
credible veto set exists.
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I will first find a vN for which pi
v
i (vN) = pi
s
i (vN), and then check the inquality.
Step 1 : To show ∃vN ∈ (c, 1), such that pivi (vN) = pisi (vN). Because cG(vY ) ≥ c,
if vN ≤ c, I have pisi (vN) = pivi (vN) = 0, which is impossible. When vY ≥ vN > c,
I have pivi (vN) = vNG(vY (vN)) − c, and pimi (vN) = pimi (0) +
∫ vN
c
G(y)dy, i.e., I need
vNG(vY (vN))− c− pimi (0)−
∫ vN
c
G(y)dy = 0. Let
φ(vi) = viG(vY (vi))−
∫ vi
c
G(y)dy − c− pimi (0),
and
φ′(vi) = G(vY (vi)) + viG′(vY (vi))v′Y (vi)−G(vi)
= [G(vY (vi))−G(vi)] + viG′(vY (vi))v′Y (vi).
Because G(·) is an increasing function, and vY (vi) ≥ vi, I have G(vY (vi))−G(vi) > 0,
and v′Y (vi) > 0. Therefore, φ
′(vi) > 0 and
φ(c) = cG(vY (c))− c− pimi (0) = c[G(vY (c))− 1]− pimi (0) < 0,
φ(1) = G(vY (1))−
∫ 1
c
G(y)dy − c− pimi (0)
= 1− c−
∫ 1
c
G(y)dy − pimi (0).
To prove
∫ 1
c
[1 − G(y)]dy > pimi (0), where pimi (0) =
∫ 1
c
[y − c − 1−F (y)
f(y)
]G(y)dF (y). I
know
φ(1) = 1G(vY (1))−
∫ 1
c
G(y)dy − c− pimi (0)
= 1− c−
∫ 1
c
G(y)dy −
∫ 1
c
[y − 1− F (y)
f(y)
− c]G(y)dF (y)
=
∫ 1
c
(1− F (y)n)dy − 1
n
[1−
∫ 1
c
F (y)ndy] +
c
n
=
n− 1
n
[1− c−
∫ 1
c
F (y)ndy].
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Because F (y)n ≤ 1, ∫ 1
c
F (y)ndy ≤ ∫ 1
c
1dy = 1− c. I have φ(1) > 0.
For vi < 1, and vY (vi) ≥ vi, since φ(vi) is continuous, φ(c) < 0, and φ(1) > 0, a
unique solution to φ(vi) = 0 exists, and is our candidate for vN .
Step 2: I want to show pivi (vi) > pi
m
i (vi) ∀vi > vN . Fix c, and hence vN and vY
are fixed, I have c ≤ c
G(vY )
≤ vN ≤ vY . The payoff difference pivi (vi) − pimi (vi) = τ is
continuous and given by:
τ =

−pimi (0) vi < c I
−pimi (0)−
∫ vi
c
G(y)dy c ≤ vi < cG(vY ) II
viG(vY )− c− pimi (0)−
∫ vi
c
G(y)dy c
G(vY )
≤ vi ≤ vY III
viH(vi)− λ(vi)H(vi)− c− pimi (0)−
∫ vi
c
G(y)dy vi > vY IV
I,II: pivi (vi)− pimi (vi) < 0, when vi < cG(vY ) .
III: Let ϕ(vi) = viG(vY )− c−
∫ vi
c
G(y)dy − pimi (0), because ϕ(vN) = φ(vN) = 0,
I have ϕ′(vi) = G(vY )−G(vi) > 0 when vi < vY , and ϕ′(vY ) = 0. Therefore,
ϕ(vi)

< 0 vi < vN
= 0 vi = vN
> 0 vi > vN .
Thus, ϕ(vY ) is strictly positive.
IV: H(vi) = F (Q(vi))
n−1,
d
dvi
[pivi (vi)− pim(vi)] =
d
dvi
[viH(vi)− λ(vi)H(vi)− c−
∫ vi
c
G(y)dy − pimi (0)]
= H(vi) + viH
′(vi)− λ(vi)H ′(vi))− λ′(vi)H(vi)−G(vi)
= (vi − λ(vi))H ′(vi) + (1− λ′(vi))H(vi)−G(vi).
Denote X = (vi − λ(vi))H ′(vi) + (1− λ′(vi))H(vi)−G(vi). λ(vi) = vi − F (vj)
(n−1)f(vj) ∂vj∂b
.
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X = [
F (vj)
(n− 1)f(vj)∂vj∂b
](n− 1)F (Q(vi))n−2f(Q(vi))Q′(vi)
+ F (Q(vi))
n−1[
f(vj)
2 ∂vj
∂vi
∂vj
∂b
− F (vj)f ′(vj)∂vj∂vi
∂vj
∂b
− F (vj)f(vj) ∂
2vj
∂b∂vi
(n− 1)f(vj)2(∂vj∂b )2
]− F (vi)n−1
=
F (vj)
n−1 ∂vj
∂vi
∂vj
∂b
[nf(vj)
2 − F (vj)f ′(vj)]− F (vj)nf(vj) ∂
2vj
∂b∂vi
(n− 1)f(vj)2(∂vj∂b )2
− F (vi)n−1.
With
∂vj
∂b
=
F (vj)
(vi − b)(n− 1)f(vj) ,
and
∂2vj
∂b∂vi
=
f 2(vj)
∂vj
∂vi
(vi − b)(n− 1)− F (vj)(1− b)(n− 1)f(vj)
[(n− 1)f(vj)(vi − b)]2
− (vi − b)(n− 1)f
′(vj)
∂vj
∂vi
[(n− 1)f(vj)(vi − b)]2 ,
X =
F (vj)
n−1 ∂vj
∂vi
∂vj
∂b
[nf(vj)
2 − F (vj)f ′(vj)]−
f(vj)
3F (vj)
n ∂vj
∂vi
(vi−b)(n−1)
[(n−1)f(vj)(vi−b)]2
(n− 1)f(vj)2(∂vj∂b )2
+
f(vj)
2F (vj)
n+1(n−1)(1−b)
[(n−1)f(vj)(vi−b)]2 +
f(vj)F (vj)
n(n−1)(vi−b)f ′(vj) ∂vj∂vi
[(n−1)f(vj)(vi−b)]2
(n− 1)f(vj)2(∂vj∂b )2
− F (vi)n−1
= F (vj)
n−2(vi − b)∂vj
∂vi
[f(vj)(n− 1) + f
′(vj)[1− F (vj)]
f(vj)
]
+ F (vj)
n−1(1− b)− F (vi)n−1.
Because bidding function is monotonic increasing, I have Q′(vi) =
∂vj
∂vi
≥ 0.2
When X ≥ 0, I have [pivi (vi)− pim(vi)] is increasing when vi > vY . To guarantee
2vj(vi) = Q(vi) is the the relationship when vi(bi) = vj(bj). When vi increases, bi
increases, which means that bj increases with a larger vj.
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that this condition holds, I have to check if X ≥ 0:
X = F (vj)
n−2(vi − b)Q′(vi)[f(vj)(n− 1) + f
′(vj)[1− F (vj)]
f(vj)
]
+ F (vj)
n−1(1− b)− F (vi)n−1
= F (vj)
n−1[
(vi − b)Q′(vi)
F (vj)
[f(vj)(n− 1) + f
′(vj)[1− F (vj)]
f(vj)
] + (1− b)− G(vi)
G(vj)
= F (vj)
n−1[
(vi − b)Q′(vi)f(vi)(n− 1)
F (vj)
+
(vi − b)Q′(vi)f ′(vj)
F (vj)f(vj)
+ 1− b− G(vi)
G(vj)
− (vi − b)Q
′(vi)f ′(vj)
f(vj)
].
If f ′(vj) ≥ 0, (vi−b)Q
′(vi)f ′(vj)
F (vj)f(vj)
≥ 0. Because F (vj) ≤ 1, (vi−b)Q
′(vi)f ′(vj)
F (vj)f(vj)
≥ (vi−b)f ′(vj)Q′(vi)
f(vj)
.
Check f ′(vj). With vi = vj, the assumption I mentioned in the beginning of this proof,
from (2), I have
v′j(b) =
F (vi)
(n− 1)(vi − b)f(vi) .
Substitute it into (4),
v′i(b) =
F (vi)− F (vN)
(vi − b)f(vi) −
(n− 2)[F (vi)− F (vN)]
(n− 1)(vi − b)f(vi)
=
F (vi)− F (vN)
(n− 1)(vi − b)f(vi) .
Comparing the second part of the righthand sides in (2) and (3) with vi = vj, I
have
F (vi)
(n− 1)f(vi)v′j(b)
=
F (vi)
(n− 1)f(vi) F (vi)(n−1)(vi−b)f(vi)
= vi − b.
Denote Z = F (vi)[F (vi)−F (vN )]
(n−2)f(vi)v′j(b)[F (vi)−F (vN )]+F (vi)f(vi)v
′
i(b)
.
Z =
F (vi)[F (vi)− F (vN)]
(n− 2)f(vi) F (vi)(n−1)(vi−b)f(vi) [F (vi)− F (vN)] + F (vi)f(vi)
F (vi)−F (vN )
(n−1)(vi−b)f(vi)
= vi − b.
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The second parts of the righthand sides in (2) and (3) are the same. Thus, I can get
when vi = vj, vi(b) = vj(b).
pivi (vi) = (vi − λ(vi))H(vi)− c
= vi − [vi − F (vi)
(n− 1)f(vi)v′j(b)
]F (Q(vi))
n−1 − c
=
F (vi)
(n−1)f(vi)F (vi)
(n−1)(vi−b)f(vi)
F (vi)
n−1 − c
= (vi − b)F (vi)n−1 − c.
∂pivi (vi)
∂b
= F (vi)
n−1v′i(b) + vi(n− 1)F (vi)n−2f(vi)v′i(b)− F (vi)n−1
− b(n− 1)F (vi)n−2f(vi)v′i(b)
= F (vi)
n−2{ F (vi)− F (vN)
(n− 1)(vi − b)f(vi) [F (vi) + vi(n− 1)f(vi)− b(n− 1)f(vi)]
− F (vi)}.
I need [F (vi)− F (vN)][F (vi) + (vi − b)(n− 1)f(vi)]− F (vi)(n− 1)(vi − b)f(vi) = 0.
0 = F (vi)
2 + F (vi)(vi − b)(n− 1)f(vi)− F (vi)F (vN)
− F (vN)(vi − b)(n− 1)f(vi)− F (vi)(n− 1)(vi − b)f(vi)
= F (vi)[F (vi)− F (vN)]− F (vN)vi(n− 1)f(vi) + bF (vN)(n− 1)f(vi).
b∗ = vi − F (vi)[F (vi)− F (vN)]
(n− 1)F (vN)f(vi) .
∂b∗
∂vi
= 1− [(n− 1)F (vN)f(vi)][f(vi)[F (vi)− F (vN)] + F (vi)f(vi)]
[(n− 1)F (vN)f(vi)]2
+
F (vi)[F (vi)− F (vN)][(n− 1)F (vN)f ′(vi)]
[(n− 1)F (vN)f(vi)]2
=
(n− 1)F (vN)f(vi)2[nF (vN)− 2F (vi)]
[(n− 1)F (vN)f(vi)]2
+
(n− 1)F (vi)F (vN)f ′(vi)[F (vi)− F (vN)]
[(n− 1)F (vN)f(vi)]2 .
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Because ∂b
∗
∂vi
≥ 0,
F (vN)f(vi)
2[nF (vN)− 2F (vi)]
(n− 1)F (vN)2f(vi)2 +
F (vi)F (vN)f
′(vi)[F (vi)− F (vN)]
(n− 1)F (vN)2f(vi)2 ] ≥ 0,
nF (vN)− 2F (vi)
(n− 1)F (vN) +
F (vi)f
′(vi)[F (vi)− F (vN)]
(n− 1)F (vN)f(vi)2 ≥ 0,
f ′(vi) ≥ f(vi)
2[2F (vi)− nF (vN)]
F (vi)[F (vi)− F (vN)] .
When n = 2, I have f ′(vi) ≥ 0.
In order to guarantee X ≥ 0, I still need (vi−b)Q′(vi)f(vi)(n−1)
F (vj)
≥ G(vi)
G(vj)
. I know
v′j(b) =
F (vj)
(n−1)(vi−b)f(vj) , and Q(vi(b)) = vj(vi(b)). Thus,
(vi−b)Q′(vi)f(vi)(n−1)
F (vj)
= Q
′(vi)
v′j(b)
.
Q′(vi(b)) =
∂Q(vi(b))
∂vi
≥ G(vi(b))
G(vj(b))
v′j(b) =
G(vi(b))
G(vj(b))
∂Q(vi(b))
∂vi
v′i(b),
I need v′i(b) ≤ G(vj(b))G(vi(b)) = 1, with vi = vj. Substitute b∗ into v′i(b) =
F (vi)−F (vN )
(n−1)(vi−b)f(vi) , I
have v′i(b) =
F (vN )
F (vi)
≤ 1. Thus X ≥ 0. The cartel is not ratifiable.
Proof of Lemma 2. I prove by contradiction. Suppose there exists a credible veto
set A and a equilibrium bid b∗ such that
pivi (vi) = pi
m
i (vi) ∀vi ∈ A. (5)
Note that it must be the case that pivi (vi) > 0 for all vi ∈ A, because pimi (vi) > 0 for
all vi ∈ [0, 1].
Let a∗ = infA. Since any vetoer type’s payoff would be zero if she were not
participating in the auction, the vetoer’s equilibrium bid b∗ must be b∗ ≥ a∗ ≥ c, i.e.,
all vetoers participate the auction with probability one. Plus, the continuity of payoff
functions implies that vi = a
∗ satisfies (5). Denote a1 < a2 < · · · < aJ the cutoffs of
the bidders in the cartel, where aj ∈ [0, 1] is used by nj bidders and
∑J
j=1 nj = n− 1.
Suppose that a∗ < 1. It must be that a1 > a∗, otherwise the bidder using a1
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loses in the auction, and earns a negative payoff. For the vetoer vi ∈ (a∗, a1),
pivi (vi)− pimi (vi) = vi
J∏
j=1
F (aj)
nj − c−
∫ vi
c
G(y)dy − pimi (0),
which is strictly increasing in vi, since
∏J
j=1 F (aj)
nj ≥ F (a1)n−1 > G(v). So, bidders
whose values in (a∗, a1) have strict incentive to veto, and thus must belong to the
veto set A, which contradicts (5). Suppose that a∗ = 1, i.e., A = 1. Given that the
vetoer is participating with probability one, none of the ratifiers will participate, and
thus pivi (1) = 1− c > pimi (1). A contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. When the bidder’s value is in [vN , 1] and participation
costs exist, he would choose to jump out of the cartel because pivi (vi) > pi
m
i (vi). When
information leakage problem exists, other bidders can update their beliefs about the
vetoer’s value through the equilibrium bid b∗. Thus, bidders know that if they submit
a bid in seller’s auction, they will lose for sure and have to pay the non-refundable
participation costs c > 0, which ends up with negative profit. When c = 0, if bidders
participate in seller’s auction, they earn zero profit which is equivalent to the profit
when they do not participate. In this case, the game becomes the non-collusive game
without participation costs. Thus, the winner’s value becomes
pivi (vi) = pi
s
i (vi) =
 0 vi < v
∗∫ vi
v∗ G(y)dy vi ≥ v∗,
which is less than
pimi (vi) =
 pi
m
i (0) vi < c
pimi (0) +
∫ vi
c
G(y)dy vi ≥ c,
Thus, the bidder with value vi ∈ A does not veto for the cartel in this case.
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APPENDIX B
TECHNICAL PROOFS
Proof of Equation (6).
Ui(vi) = E−i[vihi(vi, v−i)− xi(vi, v−i)] =
∫
v−i
[vihi(v)− xi(v)]f−i(v−i)dv−i. (1)
Suppose Y1 is the maximum value among other n−1 bidders’ values, and F (Y1)n−1 =
G(Y1), thus,∫
v−i
[vihi(v)− xi(v)]f−i(v−i)dv−i = EY1(viG(vi)− Y1)
= vi(G(vi))− E(Y1),
where E(Y1) = E(Y1|Yi < vi)G(vi). E(Y1) =
∫ vi
0
Y1dG(Y1), and E(Y1|Y1 < vi) =∫ vi
0
Y1dF (Y1|Y1 < vi), so F (Y1|Y1 < vi) = G(Y1)G(vi) . I have
E(Y1|Y1 < vi)G(vi) = E(Y1) =
∫ vi
0
Y1dG(Y1).
In second-price sealed-bid auction, the expected payment for a bidder with value
vi is:
xi(vi) = G(vi)E[Y1|Y1 < vi].
Bidder i’s utility function can be written as:
U II(vi) = viG(vi)−G(vi)E[Y1|Y1 < vi].
The bidding function in first-price sealed-bid auction is
β(vi) =
1
G(vi)
∫ vi
0
ydG(y) = E[Y1|Y1 < vi].
68
Under the condition that the bidder cannot benefit by bidding anything other than
β(vi), the bidder i’s expected utility from bidding β(vi) is as follows:
U I(vi) = G(vi)[vi − β(vi)]
= G(vi)vi −G(vi)E[Y1|Y1 < vi].
Thus,
Ui(vi) = U
I(vi) = U
II(vi).
The proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma 3. From (17),
UMi (zi, vi) = [vi − T (zi)− r]F (zi)n−1
+ [1− F (zi)n−1]
∫ vh
zi
T (si)
n− 1
(n− 1)F (si)n−2f(si)
1− F (zi)n−1 dsi
= [vi − T (zi)− r]F (zi)n−1
+
∫ vh
zi
[T (si)]F (si)
n−2f(si)dsi.
∂UMi (zi, vi)
∂zi
= [vi − T (zi)− r](n− 1)F (zi)n−2f(zi)
− T ′(zi)F (zi)n−1 − T (zi)F (zi)n−2f(zi)
= [(n− 1)vi − (n− 1)T (zi)− (n− 1)r − T (zi)]F (zi)n−2f(zi)
− T ′(zi)F (zi)n−1
= [(n− 1)vi − nT (zi)− (n− 1)r]F (zi)n−2f(zi)− T ′(zi)F (zi)n−1,
and
∂2UMi (zi,vi)
∂vi∂zi
= (n− 1)F (zi)n−2f(zi) ≥ 0. Check the truth telling condition, zi = vi,
with the transfer payment:
T (vi) = F (vi)
−n
∫ vi
r
(si − r)(n− 1)F (si)n−1f(si)dsi.
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Given zi = vi,
∂UMi (vi)
∂vi
= [(n− 1)vi − nT (vi)− (n− 1)r]F (vi)n−2f(vi)− T ′(vi)F (vi)n−1
= [(n− 1)vi − nF (vi)−n
∫ vi
r
(si − r)(n− 1)F (si)n−1f(si)dsi
− (n− 1)r]F (vi)n−2f(vi)− F (vi)n−1{−nF (vi)−(n+1)f(vi)
×
∫ vi
r
(si − r)(n− 1)F (si)n−1f(si)dsi
+ F (vi)
−n[(vi − r)(n− 1)F (vi)n−1f(vi)]}
= (n− 1)viF (vi)n−2f(vi)− nF (vi)−2f(vi)
×
∫ vi
r
(si − r)(n− 1)F (si)n−1f(si)dsi
− (n− 1)rF (vi)n−2f(vi) + nF (vi)−2f(vi)
×
∫ vi
r
(si − r)(n− 1)F (si)n−1f(si)dsi − (n− 1)(vi − r)F (vi)n−2f(vi)
= (n− 1)viF (vi)n−2f(vi)− (n− 1)rF (vi)n−2f(vi)
− (n− 1)(vi − r)F (vi)n−2f(vi)
= 0.
The proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma 4. The seller’s objective function is
U0 =
∫
V
rf(v)dv+
∑
i∈n
∫
V
hi(v)(vi−r)f(v)dv+
∑
i∈n
∫
V
(xi(v)−vihi(v))f(v)dv. (19)
Here I do not consider the case zi > vi, which can be erased by trembling hand
equilibrium. I can write
Ui(vi) = Ui(zi) +
∫ vi
zi
Mi(si)dsi ∀zi ≤ vi ∈ [0, 1].
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The third part of (19) becomes:∫
V
(xi(v)− vihi(v))f(v)dv = −
∫ 1
0
Ui(vi)f(v)dv
= −
∫ 1
0
[Ui(zi) +
∫ vi
zi
Mi(si)dsi]f(v)dv
= −Ui(zi)−
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
si
f(v)dvMi(si)dsi
= −Ui(zi)−
∫ 1
0
(1− F (si))Mi(si)dsi
= −Ui(zi)−
∫
V
(1− F (vi))hi(v)f−i(v−i)dv. (I)
Substituting (I) into (19):
U0 =
∫
V
(
∑
i∈n
(vi − r − 1− F (vi)
f(vi)
)hi(v))f(v)dv +
∫
V
rf(v)dv −
∑
i∈n
Ui(zi). (II)
From (7), the bidder’s utility function is
Ui(vi) =
∫
v−i
[vihi(v)− xi(v)]f−i(v−i)dv−i.
I can write
Ui(zi) =
∫
v−i
[vihi(v)− xi(v)−
∫ vi
zi
hi(si, v−i)dsi]f−i(v−i)dv−i.
Thus, I have
∑
i∈n Ui(zi) = 0, which means that the total distorting effect of all other
values have zero expected value. The third part of the right hand side in (II) becomes
zero. Furthermore, the second term of the right hand side is a constant. The seller’s
problem becomes
max
∫
V
(
∑
i∈n
(vi − r − 1− F (vi)
f(vi)
)hi(v))f(v)dv. (20)
The proof is complete.
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Proof of Proposition 3.
Ui(zi, vi) = E−i[vihi(zi, v−i)−xi(zi, v−i)] =
∫
V−i
[vihi(zi, v−i)−xi(zi, v−i)]f−i(v−i)dv−i,
and
k(v−i) = inf{zi|zi ≥ v0 and zi ≥ vj, ∀j 6= i},
which means that k(v−i) is the upper bound of other bidders’ bids. From (12), if a
bidder does not stay in the cartel, his expected payment is:
xi(zi) =
 k(v−i) if hi(zi, v−i) = 10 if hi(zi, v−i) = 0. (12)
The winner’s utility function in noncollusive case becomes
Ui(vi) =
∫
V−i
(vihi(zi, v−i)− k(v−i))f−i(v−i)dv−i.
and from (16)
xMi (zi) =
 T (zi) + r if hi(zi, v−i) = 1−T (zi)
n−1 if hi(zi, v−i) = 0.
(16)
In collusive case, winner’s utility function is
UMi (vi) =
∫
V−i
(vihi(zi, v−i)− T (zi)− r)f−i(v−i)dv−i.
For losers in cartel’s auction, they are better off to stay in the cartel, because they
can receive a transfer payment from the cartel, whether they can update their belief
or not. Thus, I only need to check the winner’s payoff. When bidders cannot update
their belief in noncollusive case, the payoff for the winner is the difference between his
value and the second highest value among bidders. In collusive case, the payoff is this
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difference plus a transfer payment. If the transfer payment to other n − 1 members
plus the reserve price is higher than the second highest value, bidder i would have no
incentive to stay in the cartel no matter the auction format is first-price or second-
price auction. The total transfer payment in the cartel is
T (zi) = F (zi)
−n
∫ zi
r
(si − r)(n− 1)F (si)n−1f(si)dsi,
which is the expected difference between the winner’s possible bid in the cartel and
the reserve price.
T (zi) = F (zi)
−n
∫ zi
r
(si − r)(n− 1)F (si)n−1f(si)dsi
=
n− 1
n
F (zi)
−n[
∫ zi
r
(si − r)nF (si)n−1f(si)dsi]
=
n− 1
n
F (zi)
−n[
∫ zi
r
sinF (si)
n−1f(si)dsi − r
∫ zi
r
nF (si)
n−1f(si)dsi]
=
n− 1
n
F (zi)
−n[siF (si)n|zir −
∫ zi
r
F (si)
ndsi − rF (si)n|zir ]
=
n− 1
n
F (zi)
−n[ziF (zi)n − rF (r)n −
∫ zi
r
F (si)
ndsi − rF (zi)n + rF (r)n]
=
n− 1
n
F (zi)
−n[(zi − r)F (zi)n −
∫ zi
r
F (si)
ndsi]
=
n− 1
n
(zi − r)− n− 1
n
∫ zi
r
F (si)
ndsi.
Thus, I have T (zi) + r ≤ k(z−i) = zi, where zi is the possible reporting value of the
winner. Therefore, the difference between (12) and (16) is
T (zi) + r − k(v−i) = n− 1
n
(zi − r)− n− 1
n
∫ zi
r
F (si)
ndsi + r − zi
=
1
n
(r − zi)− n− 1
n
∫ zi
r
F (si)
ndsi.
If r ≤ zi + (n− 1)
∫ zi
r
F (si)
ndsi, T (zi) + r− k(v−i) is less or equal to zero. If bidders
report their true value to the cartel, T (vi) + r − k(v−i) is always less than zero.
When information leakage problem exists, bidders can update their beliefs through
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the cartel’s auction. After updating their information, if there is a bidder vetoing for
the cartel, other bidders can enter the seller’s auction for free and bid as much as
possible to make the vetoer earn no more profit than that of staying in a cartel3. As
the result with Ui(zi, vi) ≤ UMi (zi, vi), the cartel can still be supported. Moreover,
if the cartel can generate a higher revenue for every bidder, whether the information
leakage problem exists or not, bidders would be no worse than non-cartel case.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof (a):
From (22), the seller’s problem is
max
∫
V
(
∑
i∈n
(d(vi)− v0)hi(v))f(v)dv. (III)
When cartel exists, there is only one bidder joining the seller’s auction and he submits
his bid at the seller’s reserve price. If the seller set the reserve price r = v0, her utility
is
max
∫
V
(
∑
i∈n
(r − v0)hi(v))f(v)dv = 0, (IV)
which means that she always earns her valuation when cartel exists. If she sets
the reserve price according to d−1(v0), where d−1(v0) ≥ v0, she can earn more than
v0. Comparing (III) and (IV ), I find that the seller’s optimal strategy is to set
r = d−1(v0) ≥ v0.
Proof (b):
If d−1(v0) > vh, no one has incentive to submit a bid in seller’s auction and the
cartel collapses. If d−1(v0) ≤ vh, I compare Ui(zi, vi) with UMi (zi, vi). From the proof
of Proposition 1, the cartel’s sustainable condition is r ≤ zi + (n − 1)
∫ zi
r
F n(si)dsi.
3Similar cases in Tan and Yilankaya [24], Hsueh and Tian [12].
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If d−1(v0) > zi, I have r > zi + (n− 1)
∫ zi
zi
F n(si)dsi. Thus, bidders have no incentive
to stay in the cartel. When d−1(v0) ≤ zi, T (zi) + r − k(v−i) ≤ 0 would always holds.
Bidders would choose to stay in the cartel. Therefore, the cartel is sustainable in this
case.
Proof (c):
From (b), when d−1(v0) > vh, no one’s value is higher than the seller’s reserve
price and the seller keeps the object. Even if some bidders’ value is higher than seller’s
value, the object is not sold to the bidder with the highest value, which means the
efficient condition is not satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 5. Prove by contradiction. Suppose the residual claimants
method cannot prevent a cartel. I want to show the loser’s utility Uj(vj) ≤ UMj (vj).
When winner i stays in the cartel, his expected utility function is:
UMi (zi, vi) =
∫
V−i
(vihi(zi, v−i)− T (zi)− r)f−i(v−i)dv−i.
When cartel exists, for the loser j in cartel’s auction, he receives a transfer payment
equal to T (zi)
n−1 . In non-cartel case, if the seller extracts the optimal expected payoff
directly from one of the losers, and the winner pays his bid to the loser j, the loser
j’s utility function becomes zi − r, where zi is winner i’s bid in seller’s auction.
The total transfer payment is
T (zi) =
n− 1
n
(zi − r)− n− 1
n
∫ zi
r
F (si)
ndsi.
Thus, the loser’s utility function becomes:
UMj (vj) =
1
n
(zi − r)− 1
n
∫ zi
r
F (si)
ndsi.
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When cartel exists, which is less than
Uj(vj) = zi − r.
A contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6. Prove by contradiction. Suppose the residual claimants
method can prevent bidders from staying in the cartel. I want to show the winner’s
utility Ui(zi, vi) ≤ UMi (zi, vi). Because the seller cannot force everyone to participate
in her auction, she cannot extract her payoff r = d−1(v0) from non-participants.
The utility function for the winner in cartel’s auction is:
UMi (zi, vi) =
∫
V−i
(vihi(zi, v−i)− T (zi)− d−1(v0))f−i(v−i)dv−i,
which can be maximized by bidding the reserve price. The seller can only extract
her expected profit from the single participant in her auction. In cartel case, if there
are at least two bidders’ values higher than the seller’s reserve price, the winner can
earn extra profit, 1
n
(zi − r) − 1n
∫ zi
r
F (si)
ndsi ≥ 0, where zi is the winner’s bid equal
to second highest value among cartel members. The winner’s utility is
UMi (zi, vi) = vi − zi +
1
n
(zi − r)− 1
n
∫ zi
r
F (si)
ndsi > vi − zi = Ui(zi, vi).
Thus, he has incentive to stay in the cartel. If there is only one bidder’s value
higher than r, he will be indifferent between staying in or jumping out of the cartel.
According to our assumption, he would stay in the cartel. Contradiction.
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APPENDIX C
TECHNICAL PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 5. For the collusion, the per-period maximum benefit of the
collusion is Nλ − c. If agent i colludes, his information leakage cost has a lower
bound at eβi, where eβi is the expected fine for which agent i chooses to collude.
Thus, an agent will not collude if eβi is higher than Nλ− c. Therefore, by allocating
a budget of Nλ−c
e
to monitor an agent, the government can prevent this agent from
colluding.
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider the case B ≥ 2Nλ−c
e
. I can allocate βi, βj =
Nλ−c
e
to at least two agents i and j and prevent them from colluding. If agent i does not
collude, the threshold value of βj at which j stops colluding is equal to
Nλ−c
e
. This
is the lower bound for the threshold. Similarly, since j does not collude, Nλ−c
e
is also
the threshold for i. Therefore, with some agent not colluding, if there is some other
agent l with βl <
Nλ−c
e
, then agent l can collude with a non-colluding agent and can
be elicited to collude in equilibrium. Therefore, allocating Nλ−c
e
to as many agents as
possible is the optimal strategy for the government.
When β < 2Nλ−c
e
, I consider two cases: (1)β < Nλ−c
e
. (2)Nλ−c
e
≤ β ≤ 2Nλ−c
e
. In
β < Nλ−c
e
case, the government’s optimal strategy cannot discourage any agent. Thus,
the government’s strategy is useless because all budget allocations are lower than the
optimal lower bound. When Nλ−c
e
≤ β ≤ 2Nλ−c
e
, the government can monitor directly
to one agent i. Other agents cannot be monitored directly from colluding. Consider
the case: colluding with other agents. The collusion does not want agent j to collude
when the collusive revenue from the collusion Nλ − c is lower than the minimum
information leakage cost min[eβi + (1 − βj)βe]. Thus, the strategy, allocating all
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resources to monitor one agent, rather than any others, will make it most difficult to
support the collusion, if the collusion prefers all agents to join.
Proof of Proposition 8. Proof by contradiction. I want to show player i would
choose to collude when βi =
Nλ−c
e
. When βi =
Nλ−c
e
. From
λn(s(hit))− c > maxi[βie+ (1− βi)βje], (25)
I have βie+ (1− βi)βje ≥ Nλ− c. Thus player i’s information leakage cost is higher
than his collusive revenue.
For other player j 6= i, because the government spends all budget on player i,
[β1, ..., βi−1, βi+1, ..., βn] = [0, ..., 0, 0, ...0]. From
piit(s(h
i
t)) = λn(s(h
i
t))− c1it − e[1−
∏
j∈Vt
(1− αj(s(hit)))], (24)
player j’s revenue equal to λ(n − 1) − c if he colludes, and λ(n − 2) if not collude.
Because c < λ, λ(n − 1) − c ≥ λ(n − 2). Therefore, all bidders other than agent i
choose to collude. When they collude with player i, the player j’s revenue is Nλ− c,
which is equal to i’s minimum information leakage cost: eβi = Nλ − c. Thus, other
players do not collude with player i because the lower bound of their information
leakage costs are equal to their collusive revenue. A contradiction.
In B < Nλ−c
e
case, I want to show other bidders have no incentive to collude
with player i. When B < Nλ−c
e
, from Proposition 1, the government’s strategy is to
spend all budget on player i. From (25), the information leakage cost for player i
is eβi < Nλ − c. Thus, if λn(s(hit)) > eβi, all other bidders still have incentive to
collude with player i. If all bidders choose to collude, the revenue for each bidder is
Nλ− c, which is higher than eβi. A contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 6. I have to show that d∗ exists. Notice that the first-order
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condition for the bidder’s stage I problem is:
MP (d) = pi′(d)− δ(1 + r)θgpi′(wg − (1 + r)d)
− δ(1 + r)(θb)pi′(wb − (1 + r)d)
− δ(1 + r)(θf )pi′(wf − (1 + r)d),
where MP (d) is the marginal profit. I can find when limd→0 pi′(d) = ∞, for d small
enough, MP (d) > 0. If d is sufficiently large, wg − (1 + r)d, wg − (1 + r)d, and
wf − (1 + r)d are sufficiently small. Then, I can find that MP (d) < 0. According
to these two conditions, I could say there is an unique d ≡ d∗ > 0 which makes
MP (d∗) = 0.
It is easily to check the first-order condition for MP (d) is less than zero.
∂MP (d)
∂d
= pi′′(d) + δ(1 + r)2dθgpi′′(wg − (1 + r)d)
+ δ(1 + r)2d(θb)pi
′′(wb − (1 + r)d)
+ δ(1 + r)2d(θf )pi
′′(wf − (1 + r)d)
< 0.
When d ≤ d∗, then MP (d) ≥MP (d∗), and if d > d∗, then MP (d) < MP (d∗).
Proof of Proposition 9. In order to prove Proposition 9, I want to find the solution
for the optimization problem for a member. In the state g, the optimal decision of a
member can be characterized as follows: When debt is d, the profit of vetoing in g is
pi(veto, d) = pi(d) + δ[θgpi(e) + θbpi(wb) + θfpi(wf )],
and the profit of not vetoing in g is
pi(not, d) = pi(d) + δ[θgpi(wg − (1 + r)d) + θbpi(wb) + θfpi(wf )].
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Consider the action of not vetoing. The marginal profit of not vetoing is:
MP (not, d) = pi′(d)− δ(1 + r)θgpi′(λg),
where MP denoted marginal profit of the member, and the marginal profit is de-
creasing in subsidy.
∂MP (not, d)
∂d
= pi′′(d) + δ(1 + r)2θgpi′′(λg) < 0.
Besides, limd→0 pi′(d) = ∞ implies when d small enough, MP (not, d) > 0, and for
d sufficiently large, wg − (1 + r)d is sufficiently small, and hence, MP (not, d) <
0. Therefore, there is a unique d∗ > 0 such that MP (not, d∗) = 0. Furthermore,
∂MP (not,d)
∂d
< 0 implies that if d < d∗, then MP (not, d) ≥MP (not, d∗), and if d > d∗,
then MP (not, d) < MP (not, d∗).
Proof of Proposition 10. Consider the action of vetoing. The marginal profit for
the member is
MP (veto, d) = pi′(d) > 0,
and the optimal subsidy choice is d = d¯. Therefore, if a bidder considers vetoing for
the collusion, the maximum profit when subsidy limit is d¯ is:
pi(veto, d¯) = pi(d¯) + δ[θgpi(e) + θbpi(wb) + θfpi(wf )].
In order to specify the optimal decision, I have to define the level of subsidy
at which the bidder is financially indifferent between vetoing or not. Let dˆ solve
wg − (1 + r)dˆ = e. In other words, let
dˆ =
wg − e
1 + r
.
Suppose d¯ ≤ dˆ, subsidy limit is small relative to dˆ (e = wg− (1+ r)dˆ ≤ wg− (1+
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r)d¯. That is, exemptions are small relative to net wealth after maximizing possible
subsidy payoff). Thus, the member’s optimal decision is not to veto in g. This can
be shown by considering two cases: d¯ ≤ d∗, and d¯ > d∗. When d¯ ≤ d∗, the maximum
profit from not vetoing is
pi(not, d¯) = pi(d¯) + δ[θgpi(wg − (1 + r)d¯) + θbpi(wb) + θfpi(wf )],
and maximum profit from vetoing is
pi(veto, d¯) = u(d¯) + δ[θgpi(e) + θbpi(wb) + θfpi(wf )].
d¯ ≤ dˆ implies that e = wg − (1 + r)dˆ ≤ wg − (1 + r)d¯, and hence, pi(not, d¯) ≥
pi(veto, d¯). If d¯ > d∗, then maximum profit from not vetoing is:
pi(not, d∗) = pi(d∗) + δ[θgpi(wg − (1 + r)d∗) + θbpi(wb) + θfpi(wf )],
and maximum profit from vetoing is
pi(veto, d¯) = pi(d¯) + δ[θgpi(e) + θbpi(wb) + θfpi(wf )].
Moreover, d¯ ≤ dˆ, and the optimality of d∗ implies that
pi(d∗) + δθgpi(wg − (1 + r)d∗) > pi(d¯) + δθgpi(wg)− (1 + r)d¯ ≥ pi(d¯) + δθgpi(e),
and thus, pi(not, d∗) ≥ pi(not, d¯) ≥ pi(veto, d¯).
Consider the case d¯ > dˆ, subsidy limit is large relative to dˆ (e = wg − (1 + r)dˆ >
wg − (1 + r)d¯, exemptions are large relative to net wealth after maximizing possible
subsidy payoff). Then the vetoing decision is a little more difficult to make, and it
depends on the tradeoff between exemptions and net wealth after paying off endoge-
nously determined subsidy amount. This can be seen by considering the following
cases: when dˆ ≤ d∗ (that is, exemptions are large relative to net wealth after paying
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off optimal subsidy in the case of not vetoing) and when dˆ > d∗ (that is, exemptions
are small relative to net wealth after paying off optimal subsidy in the case of not
vetoing).
Suppose dˆ ≤ d∗ (Exemptions are large relative to wealth after paying off d∗).
Then the optimal decision is to veto, and it can be seen by considering the following
two cases. If d¯ ≤ d∗, then maximum profit from not vetoing is:
pi(not, d¯) = pi(d¯) + δ[θgpi(wg − (1 + r)d¯) + θbpi(wb) + θfpi(wf )],
and maximum profit from vetoing is
pi(veto, d¯) = pi(d¯) + δ[θgpi(e) + θbpi(wb) + θfpi(wf )].
Moreover, d¯ > dˆ implies that e = wg−(1+r)dˆ > wg−(1+r)d¯, and hence, pi(veto, d¯) >
pi(not, d¯). If d¯ > d∗, then maximum profit from not vetoing is
pi(not, d∗) = pi(d∗) + δ[θgpi(wg − (1 + r)d∗) + θbpi(wb) + θfpi(wf )],
and maximum profit from vetoing is
pi(veto, d¯) = pi(d¯) + δ[θgpi(e) + θbpi(wb) + θfpi(wf )].
Moreover, dˆ ≤ d∗ implies that e = wg−(1+r)dˆ > wg−(1+r)d¯, and thus, pi(veto, d¯) >
pi(not, d¯).
Suppose dˆ > d∗ (Exemptions are small relative to d*). Then there is a unique
d¯∗, dˆ < d¯∗, such that if dˆ < d¯ < d¯∗, then optimal decision is not to veto, and if
d¯∗ < d¯, then optimal decision is to veto. This case highlights interesting dynamics.
In this case, relatively high subsidy limits additionally affect a bidder’s decision to
veto. That is, even when exemptions are relatively small as compared to a bidder’s
desired subsidy (when not vetoing), she may decide to veto, if her exemptions are
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sufficiently high to make the intertemporal bid tradeoff valuable. This sufficiently
high threshold is characterized by d¯∗. Recall from a previous case, if dˆ = d¯ and
dˆ > d∗, then pi(not, d∗) > pi(veto, d¯). In other words, if exemptions are the same
as net wealth after maximum subsidy payoff, but bidder’s optimal use of subsidy
is smaller than maximum subsidy allowed, then it is beneficial for the bidder not
to veto. Essentially because the additional bid in period 1 from additional subsidy
does not compensate for the decrease in bidding in state g that results from vetoing.
Therefore, for d¯ slightly larger than dˆ, pi(not, d∗) > pi(veto, d¯). However, in the region
[d∗,∞),∂pi(not,d)
∂d∗ = 0, and,
∂pi(veto,d¯)
∂d¯
= pi′(d¯) > 0. In other words, maximum profit from
vetoing is strictly increasing in d¯, while maximum profit from not vetoing is constant.
Moreover, pi is unbounded above. Hence, there is a unique d¯∗, dˆ < d¯∗, such that for
each d¯, if dˆ < d¯ < d¯∗, then optimal choice is not to veto; and if d¯∗ < d¯, then optimal
choice is to veto.
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